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ABSTRACT 
 
Political Science in Late Medieval Europe: 
The Aristotelian Paradigm and How It Shaped 
 the Study of Politics in the West. (August 2010) 
Mary Elizabeth Sullivan, A.B., Georgetown University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Cary J. Nederman 
 
 This dissertation looks at Aristotelian political thinkers of the later Middle Ages 
and argues that they meet all of the criteria of a mature Kuhnian science. Scholars of 
medieval Europe have spent decades arguing over exactly how one should define 
medieval Aristotelianism and which thinkers qualify as Aristotelian. I answer this 
question by turning to the philosophy of science literature. By using the criteria laid out 
by Thomas Kuhn- a common education, a shared technical language and general 
agreement on problem choice- I am able to parse out a group of political thinkers who 
qualify as a scientific community. My dissertation then goes on to illustrate how several 
different medieval thinkers were able to operate within this Aristotelian paradigm.  
This project gives scholars of the Middle Ages a more useful lens through which 
to view the phenomenon of medieval Aristotelianism. For those interested in political 
science more broadly, I demonstrate that our field has, in fact, experienced a period of 
maturity, in which scholars shared a unified paradigm and proceeded with their research 
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in concert. I also show some of the benefits and limitations of a common research 
agenda in the study of politics.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: 
WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE AN ARISTOTELIAN IN THE MIDDLE AGES? 
 
 In the thirteenth century, Western political thinkers reacquainted themselves with 
the moral and political works of Aristotle, after nearly seven centuries of absence. 
Although controversial at first, Aristotle quickly became a central part of the medieval 
curriculum, and citations of both the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics are ubiquitous 
in later medieval writing. This introduction of Aristotle contributed to a flourishing in 
the study of politics in the late Middle Ages and Renaissance. Although generally in 
agreement that Aristotle in some way reshaped political thought in late medieval Europe, 
there remains much contention among scholars as to how. A number of different 
definitions of medieval Aristotelianism have been offered over the past half-century, 
none of them fully satisfying.  
While scholars have provided many interesting insights into the role of Aristotle 
in shaping later political theory, I argue that they are inadequate to explain the rapid 
“Aristotelianization” of political thought in the later Middle Ages. I propose that using 
Thomas Kuhn’s concept of the scientific community could help shed some light on this 
phenomenon. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas S. Kuhn outlines 
several criteria for the mature scientific community, all of which, I will argue, are met by  
____________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of The Review of Politics. 
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the medieval Aristotelians. This dissertation will endeavor to explain why medieval 
political Aristotelianism qualifies as a science and why I believe this to be a particularly 
useful framework for its study. Having established these arguments, the dissertation will 
proceed to outline the growth, maturation, and eventual decline of the Aristotelian 
political paradigm through the examination of individual political thinkers, from the 
mid-thirteenth to the early fourteenth centuries. 
This dissertation will address two important questions: one for the field of 
medieval studies, the other for political science. The first is: What is medieval (political) 
Aristotelianism? Over the past several decades, numerous scholars of medieval 
intellectual history have sought a workable definition of medieval Aristotelianism. 
Previous attempts have tended either to overstate the effects of Aristotle on political 
thinking or to trivialize Aristotelianism as a mere rhetorical strategy. I believe that the 
Kuhnian approach outlined in this dissertation will avoid both of these pitfalls by 
focusing on how medieval thinkers approached the study of politics after the 
reintroduction of Aristotle, rather than on what they concluded in their studies. The 
second question regards the status of political science as a science. If one accepts 
Thomas Kuhn’s definition of the scientific community, then, I argue, one must 
acknowledge that political science is not a twentieth-century phenomenon. The political 
Aristotelians of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries meet Kuhn’s key criteria for 
scientific research. Further examination of how the Aristotelian paradigm came to be 
accepted and why it was later displaced could shed some light on how a scientific study 
of politics could work. 
 3 
THE DEBATE OVER MEDIEVAL ARISTOTELIANISM 
 
 Before setting out to argue for why a Kuhnian framework is useful in studying 
medieval Aristotelianism, this dissertation will look at how other scholars have 
approached the reception of Aristotle in the Middle Ages. Although there is general 
agreement that Aristotle had some noticeable impact on medieval political thought, 
scholars seem to have difficulty defining the phenomenon that resulted. Perhaps it would 
be more accurate to say each scholar has his or her own idea of what medieval 
Aristotelianism really is. Several different methods have been proposed for determining 
whether any given author qualifies as an “Aristotelian.” Some focus on certain 
theoretical tenets, the presence or absence of which distinguishes those authors whose 
work should be considered Aristotelian. Other scholars point to a shared language 
system or to Aristotle’s scheme for the organization of human knowledge. Under some 
definitions, nearly every late medieval thinker qualifies as an Aristotelian; according to 
others, the number is far smaller. 
 One of the most seminal investigations of the reception of Aristotle’s moral and 
political works and their long-term effect on political theory was proposed by Walter 
Ullmann.  For Ullmann, the primary contribution of Aristotelianism was to provide a 
natural foundation for the political community. In his view, the early and high Middle 
Ages were characterized by a universality and unipolarity which subsumed the natural 
and earthly aspect of human life to the spiritual and other-worldly. Rulers were reborn 
through the act of anointment into a new regenerated life. The ruler served as a “tutor” to 
the people, leading them on the path to salvation. The model of authority was entirely 
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top-down; subjects were no more entitled to choose their ruler than children would be to 
choose their teacher. In the later Middle Middle Ages, however, Ullmann argues, a 
number of factors converged to change this. Interest in Roman law, scientific studies of 
natural man and the dissemination of Aristotle’s political writing all contributed to the 
growth of humanism. In the realm of politics, humanism led to a renewed appreciation 
of the naturalness of politics. In contrast to earlier medieval thinkers, humanist political 
theorists placed the source of political power in the community itself. Authority came 
from the bottom up rather than the top down. The reintroduction of Aristotelian political 
thought was only one among a number of factors that, according to Ullmann, helped 
shape this new political outlook.1 
 In a similar vein, Quentin Skinner views the reintroduction of Aristotle’s political 
philosophy as “of overwhelming importance to the development of a modern, 
naturalistic and secular view of political life.”2 Although Skinner allows for a more 
gradual development of the “secular” view of politics, he still sees this as being 
Aristotle’s primary contribution to the Middle Ages. Likewise, Gert Sørensen argues that 
the classical conception of politics was driven nearly to extinction by Christianity. 
Aristotle’s texts served as “challenges to the hegemony of dominant religious culture.”3 
                                                 
1
 Walter Ullmann, Medieval Foundations of Renaissance Humanism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1977). 
2
 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume One: The 
Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 50.  
3
 Gert Sørensen, “The Reception of the Political Aristotle in the Late Middle Ages (From 
Brunetto Latini to Dante Alighieri): Hypotheses and Suggestions,” ed. Marianne Pade, 
Renaissance Readings of the Corpus Aristotelicum (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 
2001), pp. 9-25, p. 25. 
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 For John Morrall, the key change that comes about with the introduction of 
Aristotle’s major works in the west was a more positive outlook toward social and 
political life in general. This was in marked contrast to the previously held neoPlatonic-
Augustinian view, in which politics only existed as a remedy for man’s sinfulness after 
the fall.4 This new perspective on political life allowed for the blossoming of political 
philosophy in the late Middle Ages:  
The notion of politics as a separate branch of knowledge was not 
unfamiliar before the thirteenth century but it was the direct influence of 
Aristotle’s thought which enabled medieval political theory to come of age. 
Now for the first time since fall of the Roman Empire, western Christian 
thinkers came face to face with the possibility that political society was of 
value in its own right.5 
Aristotle, in Morrall’s opinion, both raised the status of political life and stimulated the 
study of political philosophy as a field in its own right. This led to a blossoming of 
political theory in the later Middle Ages and a shift in its tone. 
 Maurizio Viroli shares Morrall’s view that the reintroduction of Aristotle’s moral 
and political works encouraged the study of politics as a distinct discipline. “The science 
of the city” is described as the highest of the practical sciences, leading late medieval 
thinkers to grant it a particularly revered place in their studies. The Aristotelian notion of 
politics that Viroli sees as dominating political thought up through the sixteenth century 
                                                 
4
 John B. Morrall, Political Thought in Medieval Times (New York: Harper & Row, 
1958), p. 68. 
5
 Morrall, Political Thought in Medieval Times, p. 69. 
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is specifically the art of ruling the city according to reason and justice. This Aristotelian 
meaning of politics is replaced, according to Viroli, with a more pragmatic view in the 
sixteenth century.6 
 James Blythe looks at the reintroduction of Aristotle’s moral and political works 
in relation to theories of mixed constitutions in the later Middle Ages. He finds that most 
medieval Aristotelians endorse some form of the mixed regime, however, these medieval 
Aristotelians do not simply reproduce Aristotle’s constitutional views,  
Their approaches toward the question of the best government and their 
conclusions were inevitably conditioned by their particular experiences and 
political needs and problems and thus necessarily resulted in a reciprocal 
relationship with Aristotle in which on the one hand they imposed they 
concerns and values on him, and on the other he molded and significantly 
altered their modes of thought.7 
Thus, medieval Aristotelians responded both to their classical source and to the political 
conditions around them in forming their constitutional ideas. 
 In contrast, Paul Kristeller defines medieval Aristotelianism not by a shared 
doctrine but by reliance on a common Aristotelian corpus. Aristotle’s major works, 
Kristeller argues, were not studied as “great books,” but rather served as the basic 
                                                 
6
 Maurizio Viroli, “The Revolution in the Concept of Politics,” Political Theory  20, 
(1992):  473-95., esp. p. 476,  and From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and 
Transformation of the Language of Politics 1250-1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), esp. Ch. 1. 
7
 James M. Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 301, and “The Mixed Constitution and 
the Distinction between Regal and Political Power in the Work of Thomas Aquinas,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas (1986): 547-65. 
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textbooks for late medieval universities. Reliance on a certain set of texts defines a 
thinker as Aristotelian: “The Aristotelianism of the later Middle Ages was characterized 
not so much by a common system of ideas as by a common source material, a common 
terminology, a common set of definitions and problems, and a common method of 
discussing these problems.”8 One of Kristeller’s main contentions is that Aristotelianism 
in this sense did not die out in the Middle Ages but survived well into the Renaissance: 
“It has been my intention to show how Aristotle had become by the early fourteenth 
century ‘the master of those who know,’ in order to emphasize the additional fact… that 
this Aristotelian tradition, though exposed to attacks and subject to transformations, 
continued strongly and vigorously to the end of the sixteenth century and even later.”9 
 In Cary Nederman’s analysis, seeking doctrinal coherence, of the sort Ullmann 
employs, is not a particularly useful way of examining medieval Aristotelianism. While 
nearly all late medieval thinkers exhibit at least some familiarity with Aristotle, none 
could fully embrace his metaphysical precepts. Nederman therefore argues, “In my view, 
the Aristotelianism of medieval moral and political thought ought not to be defined in 
relation to a body of texts or a substantive doctrine or a mode of discourse, but instead as 
a structure which frames the manner in which questions about political and moral issues 
are raised and answered.”10 For Nederman, the key structure that defines a thinker or 
                                                 
8
 Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic and Humanist 
Strains (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), p.32. 
9
 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, pp. 33-4. 
10
 Cary J. Nederman, “The Meaning of ‘Aristotelianism’ in Medieval Moral and Political 
Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas (1996): 563-85, p. 565. See also, Francisco 
Bertelloni, “Giuridicità della ‘Scientia Politica’nella Riflessione Politica degli Artisti 
nella Prima Metà del Secolo XII,” eds. B. Calos Bazán, Eduardo Andújar, and Léonard 
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work as “Aristotelian” is Aristotle’s classification of knowledge into the practical and 
theoretical branches. Under this scheme, politics is placed above ethics and economics 
as the king of the practical sciences.  
 While some scholars have tried to discover a core Aristotelian idea or set of ideas 
or otherwise narrow their field of study to the “real Aristotelians,” Antony Black has 
taken a somewhat different approach. Black treats Aristotelian simply as one of several 
political languages available to European thinkers in the late Middle Ages. Medieval 
writers were able to plunder Aristotle’s text for a variety of terminology and historical 
exempla. Yet Black is careful to note that Aristotelian political language is just that, a 
language; there is no definite theoretical framework to which it is tied: 
Aristotle provided an enormous (for the period) wealth of concepts and 
observations which could be employed in discussing any constitution, as we find 
in post-1260 discussions of city-states, kingdoms, and the Church. Authors 
ranging from John of Hocsem through Marsilius to Giles of Rome could use 
Aristotelian to explain the merits, and when they wish the superior merits, of 
their preferred form of government, or mode of distributing authority. They 
certainly did not feel constrained, because they were Aristotelian- or, better, 
                                                                                                                                                
G. Sbrocchi, Les philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Âge: actes du IXe 
Congrès international de philosophie médiévale, Ottawa, 17-22 août 1992 (New York: 
Legas, 1995), pp. 333-67, “Zur Rekonstruktion des politischen Aristotelisimus im 
Mittelalter,” Miscellanea Mediaevalia (1998): 999-1011, and  “Les Schèmes de la 
Philosophia Practica Antèrieurs à 1265: Leu Vocabulaire Concernant la Politique et leur 
Rôle dans la Rèception de la Politique d’Aristote,”  in L’èlaboration du Vocabulaire 
Philosophique au Moyen Âge, Jacqueline Hamesse and Carlos Steel, eds. (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2000), pp. 171-202. 
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speaking Aristotelian- to agree with Aristotle about the superiority of 
‘aristocracy’ or of a mixture of oligarchy and democracy… what Aristotle ‘gave’ 
such people, that is, what they took from him, was not a set of political ‘ideas’ or 
doctrines, but a language, that is, a set of concepts and ways of expressing 
things.11 
Black’s methodology treats Aristotelian language as tool, and, for him, the interesting 
question is how and to what end each thinker chooses to employ it. 
 While the above scholars all focus on political Aristotelianism, it is important to 
remember that the transmission of Aristotle’s works in the Middle Ages had a profound 
impact on a variety of fields. Charles Lohr has examined the effects of Aristotle on 
numerous different scientific fields in the Middle Ages. Lohr contends that Aristotle 
aided medieval thinkers in breaking away from a “clerical” notion of science, in which 
the authority of divinely ordained masters went unchallenged. The recovery of Aristotle 
helped create a more modern science based on continual testing and questioning of 
theories. However, Lohr is careful to note, this change didn’t come about overnight. The 
initial reaction to Aristotle’s texts was dismay (at their contradiction to Christian 
beliefs), then reverence, and finally a critical analysis.12 Richard Rubenstein makes a 
                                                 
11
 Anthony Black, “Political Languages in Later Medieval Europe,” in The Church and 
Sovereignty c.590-1918. ed. D. Wood (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 318-19. See also 
Roberto Lambertini, “La diffusione della ‘Politica’ e la Definione di un Linguaggio 
Politico Aristotelico,” Quaderni Storici, vol. XXXIV (1999), pp. 677-704.   
12
 C.H. Lohr, “The Medieval Interpretation of Aristotle,” eds., Norman Kretzman, 
Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 80-98, see also Francisco 
Bertelloni, “Presupestos de la Recepción de la Politica de Aristóteles,” eds., Fernando 
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similar argument that the recovery of Aristotle brought a more rational and enlightened 
discourse to medieval minds.13  
Additionally, Edward Grant, for example, had explored the usefulness of the 
term “Aristotelian” in studying late medieval natural philosophy. Given the central role 
that Aristotelianism played in shaping natural philosophy through much of the Middle 
Ages and Renaissance, and the wide variety of thinkers who can fall under this heading, 
Grant seeks to determine “whether the terms ‘Aristotelianism’ and ‘Aristotelian’ can be 
assigned significant meaning.”14 Toward this end, he offers a variety of possible 
approaches to Aristotelianism in natural philosophy. The one he finds most promising is 
a “species” approach, in which Aristotelianism consists of the collection of individual 
Aristotelian thinkers, even if some depart from Aristotle in key areas: 
There is no need for a definition of Aristotelianism, since the term 
embraces a population with inherent similarities and individual differences. 
Unlike [the previously discussed possibilities] there is no norm against 
which to measure whether a departure has occurred. In this sense, there are 
no departures or anomalies. There are only individual Aristotelians who 
produce individual Aristotelianisms.15 
                                                                                                                                                
Domínguez, Rudei Imbach, Theodor Pindl and Peter Walter, Aristetelica et Lulliana 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), pp. 35-54. 
13
 Richard E. Rubenstein, Aristotle’s Children: How Christians, Muslims, and Jews 
Rediscovered Ancient Wisdom and Illuminated the Middle Ages (New York: Harcourt, 
2003). 
14
 Edward Grant, “Ways to Interpret the Terms ‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Aristotelianism’ in 
Medieval and Renaissance Natural Philosophy,” History of Science xxv (1987): 335-57., 
p. 342. 
15
 Grant, “Ways to Interpret the Terms…” p. 248. 
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Grant even goes so far as to say, “Aristotle himself becomes simply another unprivileged 
Aristotelian.”16 
 
WHAT THESE AUTHORS HAVE ACHIEVED AND WHERE THEY HAVE 
FAILED 
 Looking at medieval Aristotelianism and its legacy, there appear to be many 
different ways in which it helped shaped later medieval political theory. Each author 
discussed above has found a slightly different aspect of this transformation on which to 
focus. Ullmann notes the introduction of bottom-up theories of political authority; 
Blythe, the appearance of theories of the mixed regime; Nederman, the categorization of 
knowledge into practical and theoretical fields. Several scholars argue that Aristotle’s 
texts helped break up the Church’s stranglehold on knowledge. The problem is that, 
although these characteristics of medieval Aristotelianism are all generally true, they do 
not fully capture the shift that took place in the study of politics in the west after the 
reintroduction of Aristotle’s work. Walter Ullmann and those who followed in his 
footsteps, for example, have often been criticized for drawing too sharp a line between 
the early and late Middle Ages.17 Not all political thinkers writing before Aristotle’s 
recovery adhered to a strictly top-down notion of divinely mandated political power, nor 
did this type of theory disappear immediately after the translation of the Politics. 
                                                 
16
 Grant, “Ways to Interpret the Terms…” p. 348. 
17
 See for example, Antony Black, Political Thought in Medieval Europe; Cary J. 
Nederman, “The Meaning of ‘Aristotelianism’ in Medieval Moral and Political 
Thought” and “Aristotelianism and the Origins of ‘Political Science’ in the Twelfth 
Century” Journal of the History of Ideas 52 (1991): 179-94. 
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However, my objection to Ullmann’s thesis is different; by choosing a single doctrine 
that serves as the litmus test for whether or not a thinker qualifies as an Aristotelian, 
Ullmann neglects one of the most interesting facets of medieval Aristotelianism- the 
variety of perspectives it encompasses. Medieval Aristotelians frequently disagree with 
one another and even with Aristotle.  To choose a single Aristotelian doctrine is to 
ignore the diversity of thinkers who claimed adherence to Aristotelian principles in the 
Middle Ages.  While Ullmann is the most prominent example of this tendency, Skinner, 
Blythe, Nederman, and Lohr all fall prey to it to some degree. The resulting definitions 
of medieval Aristotelianism are too narrow. Important and interesting thinkers who were 
influenced by Aristotle’s thought are overlooked because they fail to include a particular 
political or philosophical doctrine in their work. 
 On the other hand, with an approach like that of Antony Black, the term 
“Aristotelian” becomes so inclusive as to be almost meaningless. Black’s work on 
political languages in the Middle Ages is very insightful. As he has noted, medieval 
political thinkers were able to draw on a variety of language systems, blending them and 
moving between them as suited their argument. Like this dissertation, Black criticizes 
previous scholars who have tried to choose a single doctrine as necessary for inclusion in 
a particular category (such as Aristotelian). However, Black’s thesis does not capture all 
that is going on with medieval Aristotelians in the later Middle Ages. While use of 
Aristotelian language does not entirely determine what arguments a political thinker can 
make, there is more to the recovery of Aristotelian political philosophy than just the 
addition of one more language system. As noted by Viroli, more thinkers were looking 
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at political issues and doing so in a more focused and organized way.18 Black’s argument 
is interesting but misses parts of the picture. 
 This dissertation outlines an alternative way of addressing political 
Aristotelianism in the Middle Ages, one that avoids the pitfalls of a overly narrow 
classification based on doctrinal orthodoxy, on the one side, and the overly lax linguistic 
systems, on the other. In the following chapter, I argue that the philosophy of science 
literature offers a useful corrective to both camps. By borrowing from Thomas Kuhn’s 
terminology, I argue that medieval Aristotelianism can best be viewed as a paradigm for 
the practice of political science in the Middle Ages. Medieval political thinkers took 
from Aristotle a methodology for the study of politics which they then applied to the 
political structures of their own day. This definition of Aristotelianism is more stringent 
than that of Black because, in order to be considered part of the Aristotelian community, 
thinkers not only had to utilize Aristotle’s political language but also to engage in the 
Aristotelian project of finding the best constitution. Chapter II provides a more complete 
outline of what medieval Aristotelian political science entails. My definition of 
Aristotelianism also avoids the pitfalls of Ullmann and his ilk; there are no restrictions 
on what conclusions medieval Aristotelians could reach in their investigations. Medieval 
Aristotelians could, and often did, disagree about the best forms of government.   
 The remainder of this dissertation examines the medieval Aristotelian paradigm. 
Chapter II explains how the medieval Aristotelians fit into Kuhn’s definition of a 
                                                 
18
 Maurizio Viroli, “The Revolution in the Concept of Politics,” and From Politics to 
Reason of State, esp. Ch. 1. 
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scientific community. It also makes the case that examination of this early paradigm in 
the study of politics could be of use to current political scientists who are concerned with 
the current lack of a unified paradigm in the field. Chapter III explains how Aristotle’s 
Politics provides a model for a political science based on comparative constitutional 
studies. Chapter IV explores the work of Brunetto Latini, an Italian republican theorist 
writing just before the Latin translation of the Politics became available then outlines the 
recovery of Aristotle’s moral and political works and examines some of the early 
commentaries. Chapter V covers Ptolemy of Lucca’s De regimine principum, a defense 
of republican government written in the mature Aristotelian paradigm. Finally, Chapter 
VI explores Dante Alighieri and his theories of world empire. 
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CHAPTER II 
MEDIEVAL ARISTOTELIANISM AS A KUHNIAN SCIENCE 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, medieval Aristotelianism has proved 
problematic for scholars of the later Middle Ages. No Christian could fully accept 
Aristotle’s premises; yet, nearly every political thinker cited his major works. 
Furthermore, Aristotelian political thinkers come from a variety of different political 
perspectives and advocate completely different forms of government. How then does 
one classify an Aristotelian in the Middle Ages? This dissertation proposes that the 
phenomenon of medieval political Aristotelianism be treated as a scientific paradigm, in 
accordance with the theories of Thomas Kuhn. In this chapter, I first outline Kuhn’s 
notion of science and the arguments for why it may be a useful way to view the history 
of political science. Having done this, I go on to explain why medieval Aristotelianism 
qualifies as a scientific paradigm. I argue that this approach to political Aristotelianism 
avoids the error of calling any thinker who cites Aristotle an “Aristotelian”; a more 
thorough adherence to an Aristotelian project is necessary. At the same time, this 
approach does not require that medieval thinkers thoroughly conform to any particular 
Aristotelian principle or set of principles. As long as a thinker followed the methodology 
of the Aristotelian paradigm, he or she could produce a variety of different conclusions.  
For scholars of the late Middle Ages, the Kuhnian framework provides a new and 
fruitful way of viewing political Aristotelianism, explaining why Aristotle was accepted 
so universally and how he shaped political inquiry in the later Middle Ages. For those 
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interested in political science, and particularly in its status as a science, the later chapters 
of this dissertation will illustrate how a mature paradigm was able to operate in this field. 
Like any paradigm, the political Aristotelianism of the later Middle Ages both provided 
new opportunities for productive research and limited its scope. 
 
THOMAS KUHN AND THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 
In his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn offers a 
description of scientific progress that is at odds with the textbook account of incremental 
discovery. Kuhn examines the history of science, paying particular attention to how 
scientific communities regulate themselves. In Kuhn’s view, mature sciences alternate 
between periods of “normal science” and “revolutions,” where the very assumptions of a 
field are challenged. Each revolution provides a new paradigm (a set of assumptions 
about the world), through which the work of normal science can begin again. In the 
period before maturity,19 multiple paradigms can compete for legitimacy among the 
scientific community. There are no “rules” for how the process of scientific research 
should proceed. While this may, at first, appear to provide opportunities for creative 
exploration, Kuhn argues that it is problematic: “In the absence of a paradigm or some 
candidate for a paradigm, all the facts that could possibly pertain to the development of a 
given science seem equally relevant…. In the absence of a reason for seeking some 
particular form of more recondite information, early fact-gathering is usually restricted 
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to the wealth of data that lie ready to hand.”20 Research is a random and unfocused 
process. 
Without a shared paradigm, scientists do not know which questions are 
important. Furthermore, it is difficult for the scientific community to proceed together as 
a community, to relate the work of one scholar to that of another: “Different men 
confronting the same range of phenomena, but not usually all the same particular 
phenomena, describe and interpret them in different ways.”21 Kuhn is careful to point out 
that genuine (and important) scientific discoveries can be made during these phases of 
competing or non-paradigmatic science. However, since each scholar must start from 
scratch in justifying his or her basic assumptions, and no commonly accepted framework 
directs research toward a particular set of questions, it is an inefficient use of scientists’ 
energy. 
Kuhn depicts science in its early stages is disorganized and often lacking in 
explanatory theory; however things do not usually stay this way. When an individual or 
a group comes up with a theory than can explain more and attract a greater number of 
followers, competing theories die out or their adherents are relegated to other fields. 
New practitioners of the science are socialized into this new “paradigm,” and scholarship 
can proceed without each thinker having to justify his or her assumptions. Research 
becomes more focused:  
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The new paradigm implies a new and more rigid definition of the field. 
Those unwilling or unable to accommodate their work to it must proceed in 
isolation or attach themselves to some other group…. It is sometimes just 
its reception of a paradigm that transforms a group previously interested 
merely in the study of nature into a profession or, at least, a discipline.22 
Thus, a field becomes a “Science.” Those who follow the paradigm are part of the 
scientific process, and those that do not are forced out of the community. 
 The type of research undertaken once a group of scientists has accepted a 
common paradigm is what Thomas Kuhn calls “normal science.” Kuhn compares 
normal science to puzzle-solving. The paradigm dictates what sort of research is to be 
done and what sort of questions are to be asked:  
One of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a 
criterion for choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for 
granted, can be assumed to have solutions. To a great extent these are the 
only problems that the community will admit as scientific or encourage its 
members to undertake. Other problems, including many that had previously 
been standard, are rejected as metaphysical, as the concern of another 
discipline, or sometimes as just too problematic to be worth the time.23 
The scientific community agrees on what questions are appropriate and what constitutes 
the aims of their field. This development is key. While the acceptance of a paradigm 
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generally signals a period of increased progress in a science, it also usually means a 
drastic narrowing of the field.  
Normal scientists not only gravitate toward the puzzles that their paradigm 
promises a solution to; they actually avoid questions that might challenge the 
foundations of the paradigm. In many cases, questions or phenomena that do not fit 
within the boundaries of the paradigm are simply not “seen” at all. Experiments are 
undertaken to show how nature agrees with the paradigm, not to test the validity of its 
assumptions.  Under the conditions of normal science, according to Kuhn, “To dessert 
the paradigm is to cease practicing the science it defines.”24 
Periods of normal science do not, however, last forever. When anomalies are 
discovered that challenge that assumptions of the paradigm, the first response is to try to 
explain them away from within the existing paradigm. If this does not succeed, scholars 
will begin tinkering with the paradigm, making minor adjustments to its premises, as 
was seen in Ptolemaic astronomy in the sixteenth century. Scientists will struggle to 
preserve the paradigm until anomaly and confusion become so great that the field enters 
a period of crisis. As Kuhn elaborates, “All crises begin with the blurring of a paradigm 
and the consequent loosening of the rules for normal research. In this respect research 
during crisis very much resembles research during the pre-paradigm period…”25 
Sometimes a crisis is handled satisfactorily by normal science; sometimes a problem is 
simply set aside or ignored. One some occasions, however, crisis leads to the proposal of 
an entirely new paradigm. This is what Kuhn deems a “revolution,”  
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a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that 
changes some of the field’s most elementary theoretical generalizations as 
well as many of its paradigm methods and applications. During the 
transition period there will be a large but never complete overlap between 
the problems that can be solved by the old and by the new paradigm. But 
there will also be a decisive difference in the modes of solution. When the 
transition is complete, the profession will have changed its view of the 
field, it methods, and its goals.26 
Scholars who do not buy into the new paradigm are excluded from the science, which 
has itself been redefined. Normal science then begins again with a new set of 
assumptions and a new focus for its investigations. 
 Kuhn’s approach to the history of science is distinctly different from the 
incremental growth model put forward by those such as Karl Popper and Carl Hempel.27 
There is no sense of steady progress toward Truth; periods of simple puzzle-solving 
alternate with revolutions that redefine contours of the science itself. Science proceeds 
within the boundaries of its paradigm. Observations can only be made through the lens 
of theory. There are no universal objective criteria for proper scientific method. Each 
community of scholars sets its own rules for how experiments should be preformed and 
what questions should be investigated, in accordance with the current paradigm. The 
paradigm provides commonly accepted assumptions within which science can progress 
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but also limits the types of investigations considered acceptable. The paradigm, in effect, 
makes the science. 
 
KUHNS’S THEORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 A number of different scholars have considered whether Kuhn’s model of 
science might be applicable to the social sciences. These scholars come at Kuhn’s text 
from a variety of different directions and with multiple aims. Some want to use Kuhn’s 
theory as a model for how to make political science more “scientific.” Others think 
Kuhn’s model provides a more positive view of political science vis-à-vis the natural 
sciences. Since Kuhn himself has explicitly denied that The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions should be read as a prescription for how a field can attain scientific maturity, 
I will not spend much time on those who read his text proscriptively. Kuhn’s study is 
intended as a description of how scientific communities work in practice, not a set of 
guidelines. However, there has also been considerable debate about how accurate 
Kuhn’s depiction of science is and whether it is applicable to fields other than the 
traditional natural sciences.  
Gabriel Almond, for example, uses Kuhn in his 1966 call for continuing the trend 
of creating a more scientific political science. Almond specifically denies Socratic and 
Aristotelian political thinking the title of "political science" on the basis of its heavy 
reliance on psychology and sociology. Almond believes that in his lifetime, political 
science had taken a great step forward with the advent of the systems approach. In 
Almond's view, this paradigm for the study of politics was clearly more scientific than 
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its predecessors and signals the nearing maturity of the field.28 Almond seems to misread 
Kuhn in two ways. The first is by denying that earlier paradigms, including 
Aristotelianism, were scientific, because they do not follow the systems approach that 
was prevalent during his career. Kuhn’s theory provides no basis for arguing that one 
paradigm is more or less “scientific” than another. Second, Almond takes The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions as containing a normative claim, that sciences should adopt a 
unified paradigm if they wish to be “real,” i.e., mature sciences. Kuhn explicitly denies 
such a reading. He was not exploring what scientific communities should do, only what 
they had done in the past. Kuhn specifically levels these criticisms at those in the social 
sciences who tried to use his work as a blueprint for how they should catch to other 
fields.29 
 A more useful appropriation of Kuhn can be found in Sheldon Wolin, who 
contends that Kuhn’s framework is, in fact, very useful for the study of politics. While 
the history of political thought might not resemble a science in the strict positivist sense, 
it does if one follows Kuhn’s definition. Wolin uses Kuhn to take aim at the (false) 
notion that there can be no progress in political theory. Part of the blame, according to 
Wolin, lies with scholars of historical political theory, who are more eager to point out 
the differences between theories than to trace continuity or progress.30 Wolin contends 
that political theorists actually laid the foundations for one another in their work. Under 
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Wolin’s understanding, the great thinkers of traditional political theory are akin to 
Kuhn’s “revolutionary” scientists: 
When applied to the history of political theory, Kuhn’s notion of 
paradigms…invites us to consider Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, 
Locke, and Marx as the counterparts in political theory to Galileo, Harvey, 
Newton, Laplace, Faraday, and Einstein. Each of the writers in the first 
group inspired a new way of looking at the political world; in each case 
their theories proposed a new definition of what was significant for 
understanding that world; each specified distinctive methods for inquiry; 
and each of the theories contained an explicit or implicit statement of what 
should count as an answer to certain basic questions.31 
These thinkers are noteworthy because they changed the way people (or at least other 
political theorists) looked at politics. The names of the “normal scientists” who 
continued work within the frameworks provided by these writers are largely forgotten 
except by serious scholars of the period in question. Wolin even offers Aristotelian-
Thomists of the Middle Ages and Lockean liberals as examples of political thinkers who 
shared a common paradigm.32 
 In Wolin’s view, political scientists do not see the progress in these traditions 
because, “instead of interpreting past theories as preparing the way for the next phase of 
political theories, commentators and lecturers tend to underscore the differences between 
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the great theorists.”33 Furthermore, thinkers who practice normal puzzle-solving are 
dismissed as unoriginal and derivative (and therefore not given much attention). I would 
add to this explanation the tendency for historians of political thought to defend the work 
of their particular period as especially valuable. Thus, students of politics fail to see the 
progress their predecessors have made. In actuality, according to Wolin, there has been a 
significant accumulation of knowledge in the study of politics. 
 Paradigms in political theory provide the same sort of basic assumptions and 
framework for approaching research as in the natural sciences: “A paradigm is not 
intended to solve all puzzles in advance, but to supply the means for solving them, even 
if they have not been anticipated.”34Wolin then goes on to defend thinkers who apply a 
paradigm to problems that its originator may never have intended. While some would 
criticize such thinkers for “distorting” the original paradigm, Wolin argues they are 
being good scientists, using the paradigm to approach the important political puzzles of 
their day. 
 The key insight of Structure of Scientific Revolutions, according to Wolin’s 
reading, is the way paradigms are socially enforced and the narrowness of the research 
they permit. A paradigm does not necessarily win out because it is better than the rest 
but because it has attracted a critical mass of followers: “Kuhn describes the process of 
initation as partly a matter of winning the loyalty of a new generation of scientists to the 
view of the world embodied in a paradigm, and partly as a matter of enforcing the 
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authority of the paradigm… upon the initiates.”35 Thus, the adoption and enforcement of 
the paradigm is fundamentally a social act. The paradigm then sets rather rigid rules for 
what type of work is to be done. Arguing against those who claim political science to be 
a young, immature science, Wolin claims that there have been multiple dominant 
paradigms over the course of its history, starting with Plato and his followers and leading 
up to the current (at the time of his writing) behaviorist domination. 
 This application of Kuhn’s theory to political science has not gone unchallenged. 
Wolin has been criticized for accepting Kuhn’s formulation too uncritically, as well as 
using Kuhn to defend traditional political theory against modern political science. The 
first charge is accurate and can be applied to any political scientists who have attempted 
to adopt Kuhn’s framework. Kuhn himself backed down from some of the more extreme 
positions taken in Structure of Scientific Revolutions, such as the complete inability to 
communicate information between paradigms. However, even a slightly watered down 
Kuhn can still prove useful to the social sciences. In terms of the relationship between 
political science and political theory, some of Wolin’s critics have badly misconstrued 
his work. Jerone Stephens writes: 
Wolin claims that behaviorists have misconstrued the nature of traditional 
theory, and this misunderstanding has in turn misled them about the nature 
of their own undertaking. By equating behaviorism with Kuhn’s normal 
science, and traditional theory with extraordinary science, Wolin believes 
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that he can set the behaviorist straight and also correctly point out the 
vocation of the traditional theorist.36 
I did not take this to be Wolin’s point at all. Wolin uses Kuhn to defend political science 
vis-à-vis the natural sciences. He contends that the “great thinkers” of political theory 
are revolutionaries; normal scientists followed in their footsteps, but their work is 
generally dismissed as derivative. If anyone is to blame for the mistaken belief that there 
has been no progress in political theory, it is not empirical political scientists but 
scholars of the history of political thought. Wolin also asserts that the current paradigm 
for the study of politics is behaviorism, rigidly enforced by university departments. 
However, Stephens’ assertion that Wolin thinks behaviorism is normal science and 
(contemporary) political theory serves as the creative revolutionary branch of the 
discipline is entirely false. Wolin simply thought the field was in a state of normal 
science. 
 Overall, Wolin’s analysis of how Kuhn can be applied to the study of politics is 
insightful. He does perhaps accept Kuhn’s views too uncritically and fail to examine 
whether the history of science truly matches his description. Additionally, the 
importance of enforcement in paradigm adoption, while true, may be exaggerated by 
Wolin. Nevertheless, his contention that great political theorists such as Plato, Aristotle, 
Hobbes, and Locke can be compared to Kuhn’s revolutionary scientists places political 
science (and the history of political thought) in a different light. 
                                                 
36
 Jerone Stephens, “The Kuhnian Paradigm and Political Inquiry: An Appraisal,” 
American Journal of Political Science (1973): 467-488, p. 484. 
 27 
 While Thomas Kuhn offered the first, and perhaps most dogmatic, account of 
how paradigms function in the sciences, there are alternative versions.  In particular, 
Imre Lakatos proposed a model in which multiple paradigms can coexist within a single 
field.37 Unlike Kuhn, Lakatos is more openly prescriptive, advising that new research 
programs should be nurtured and protected from the strict falsificationists of Popper’s 
ilk. Multiple paradigms working on their separate puzzles, in Lakatos’s view, can make 
for the most productive science. It is Lakatos’s view of the scientific community that 
Terrence Ball adopts in his analysis of progress in the study of politics: “Scientific 
progress, according to Lakatos, can only be gauged by looking at the successes and 
failures, not of single theories but of successive series of theories, each sharing common 
core assumptions.”38 Researchers create a “protective belt” of auxiliary theories which 
serves to keep the core afloat when it encounters anomalies. As long as the adjustments 
in a research program are content-increasing, i.e., able “to predict novel facts even as 
they explain old anomalies,” that program can be said to be fruitful.39 However, research 
programs can dry up and die out. Both Lakatos and Ball caution against killing off a 
research program prematurely because it encounters anomalies (Ball suggests that this 
may have happened to Marxism).40 Ball’s conclusion is a call for tolerance of multiple 
paradigms or research agendas in political science and a sort of protectionism for 
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budding programs: “We political scientists have not… treated our budding research 
programs (or traditions) very leniently. On the contrary, we have made them sitting 
ducks; and, in a discipline which includes many accomplished duck hunters, this has 
often proved fatal.”41 This alternative reading concurs with Kuhn on the role of 
paradigms and its opposition to dogmatic falsificationism, but does not make 
paradigmatic exclusivity the litmus test for maturity in science. 
 The general consensus is that Kuhn’s theory of the history of science has at least 
some applicability to the field of political science. Researchers agree upon a common set 
of assumptions that are socially enforced and direct future research. Communication 
between paradigms, while not impossible, is definitely strained, and the subjects of 
interest are often entirely different. In Kuhn’s view, the presence of multiple competing 
paradigms is a sign of crisis. Lakatos and Ball actually encourage the flowering of 
multiple research programs as conducive to scientific productivity. However, the key 
tension between these schools is not simply whether one or more paradigms are 
permitted but the aims of their writing; Kuhn is proposing a sociological description of 
how sciences operate, while Lakatos and Ball are making normative suggestions for how 
they should operate. Ball’s contention that Marxism was killed off before it had a chance 
to take root actually supports Kuhn’s thesis that the adherents of a paradigm will try to 
wipe out or isolate competing viewpoints. For this dissertation, I will be adopting a 
modified Kuhnian framework. Whether or not the presence of two or more paradigms 
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signals a state of crisis and/or immaturity, I will argue that communication between 
research programs is so troublesome that they may as well be separate subfields. 
 
ARISTOTELIANISM AS A POLITICAL PARADIGM 
 Having established that Kuhn’s model of science is useful, if not perfect, how 
then does it help shed light on medieval Aristotelianism? Medieval scholars have long 
struggled to explain the sudden adoption of Aristotelian language and (parts of) 
Aristotelian philosophy by late medieval thinkers. Sheldon Wolin has already proposed 
that if political scientists adopted a Kuhnian framework, Aristotelianism should be 
considered one of the paradigms in its history. This is an approach that has been 
neglected among medievalists. Medieval Aristotelianism fits the key criteria Kuhn lays 
out for a mature science. Its adherents shared a set of basic assumptions about the world, 
a language system that facilitated scholarly communication, and agreement on what 
questions were appropriate subjects for political inquiry. The medieval Aristotelian 
framework, however, is not straight Aristotelianism, but a uniquely medieval 
conglomeration, including Christian, Germanic, and Roman elements. However, the 
reintroduction of Aristotle in the late thirteenth century provided the spark that brought 
these elements together into a coherent research agenda in politics. 
 The clearest connection between the various Aristotelian political writers is their 
frequent citation of Aristotle and use of Aristotelian political language. Antony Black 
has already documented the explosion in Aristotelian political language in the late 
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries and pointed out that using Aristotelian language 
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did not necessarily limit what any given author could say.42 However, this language did 
provide political theorists with their own set of technical jargon. Medieval thinkers were 
immersed in Aristotle during their training period (most notably at the University of 
Paris). The vocabulary they thereby acquired could be utilized, and understood, by 
thinkers from a wide variety of ideological positions. Specifically, medieval 
Aristotelians adopted Aristotle’s six-fold classification of regimes and the definitions for 
the types of constitutions contained therein. They also adopted the Aristotelian virtue 
language of the Nicomachean Ethics. This political jargon served to both facilitate 
scholarly discourse and identify its users to each other as members of the same 
community of political scientists. 
 In addition to political terminology, Aristotle provided his medieval readers with 
a ready supply of historical exempla that would be common knowledge among the 
community of political scientists. Everyone would recognize the Spartan constitution as 
a polity or Dionysius as a tyrant. Citations of such passages could provide authoritative 
illustrations without forcing authors to take the potentially politically dangerous step of 
commenting directly on current political situations. Like Aristotle’s political 
terminology, these examples both acted as commonly recognized shorthand that political 
theorists would all understand and identified the writers as a correctly socialized student 
of politics. 
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 A paradigm, however, is more than just a language system. These political 
theorists also shared many basic assumptions about the world. Some came from their 
reading of Aristotle: political life is natural, virtue can be acquired through education, 
democracy is a corrupt form of government, etc. Other assumptions grew out of their 
common Christian religious beliefs: God will punish sinners in the afterlife, men and 
women have free will, etc. Beliefs such as these did not need to be justified in political 
works; they could simply be taken for granted. Furthermore, any thinker who openly 
disagreed with one of these propositions would, at the very least, not be taken seriously 
by his or her peers. 
 The ties between medieval Aristotelian thinkers do not stop here. As members of 
a scientific paradigm, these political thinkers all agreed upon the proper goal for political 
inquiry: determining the best sort of political regime. The centrality of this particular 
research question became a hallmark of medieval Aristotelian political inquiry. Maurizio 
Viroli recognizes this search for the best form of government as a key characteristic of 
political thought after the dissemination of Aristotle in the West, though his primary 
interest lies in later European thought:  
The rediscovery of the Politics helped the students to consider politics not only 
as the art of ruling the city according to reason and justice but also as the 
science of the city in general… The focus of political discourse was no longer 
the ruler but rather the constitution and the collective life of the city. Political 
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inquiry shifted from the duties and qualities of the political man to the 
assessment of the comparative merits of political regimes.43 
Thus, the translation of the Ethics, and to an even greater extent, the Politics 
fundamentally reshaped how medieval political thinkers approached their work. Political 
writers seeking to answer Aristotle’s main political question- What is the best type of 
regime?- and employing his framework of classification, in more or less modified ways, 
can provide scholars with yet another definition of  a limited ‘medieval Aristotelianism’ 
 As mentioned above, it is the determination to answer the same question and not 
any particular argumentative position that leads these thinkers into a community of 
learning. Thomas Kuhn meditated at length about the definition of the scientific 
community as a circumscribed community of learning.  When discussing the relationship 
between his notion of ‘paradigms’ and the structure of the scientific community, he 
stated, “Having isolated an individual specialists’ group, I would next ask what its 
members shared that enabled them to solve puzzles and that accounted for their relative 
unanimity in problem-choice and in the evaluation of problem-solutions.”44 The political 
thinkers who embraced political Aristotelianism shared ideas about “problem-choice”, as 
well as a set of political concepts that permits communication between theories. 45 
 Thus, the Aristotelian paradigm served all the major functions outlined by Kuhn. 
Medieval Aristotelians shared basic assumptions about the political world. They had a 
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technical language system allowing easy communication among scholars. Above all, 
medieval Aristotelians agreed on the primary aim of political inquiry:determining which 
type of constitution is best. This Aristotelian framework, adopted by the end of the 
thirteenth century, was reinforced through the training at medieval universities, which 
had adopted Aristotle’s Politics as their primary political text. While earlier political 
thinkers, such as Thomas Aquinas, had to fight for the acceptability of teaching 
Aristotle, later medieval theorists could take basic Aristotelian principles for granted. 
New generations of political scientists were socialized within the medieval Aristotelian 
paradigm. 
 Scientific paradigms become dominant when a critical mass of followers unites 
behind them. Once accepted, the paradigm is then enforced from within the field. There 
is evidence that this was the case with medieval Aristotelianism. As was already 
mentioned, Aristotle’s political and social works had become standard university texts. 
Aristotle’s authority was almost unquestionable. As later chapters will show in detail, 
political thinkers who disagreed with each other and with Aristotle all still cite the 
Philosopher in their work. Disagreements with Aristotle were handled in a variety of 
ways. One could, either through guile or actual ignorance, misrepresent Aristotle so as to 
make him agree with the argument. Other writers very deliberately cited the positions 
Aristotle was arguing against as his own. Some, such as Ptolemy of Lucca, simply 
promise to explain away the contradiction later and then never do. Some scholars, such 
as James Blythe, attribute these misuses of Aristotle as the result of simple ignorance or 
confusion due to Moerbeke’s overly literal translation; however, this interpretation does 
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not give medieval thinkers enough credit. While medievals may have occasionally 
misunderstood Aristotle’s text, there are also many clear cases of manipulation. 
 In some instances, medieval thinkers were just taking advantage of Aristotle’s 
authority to add legitimacy to their own argument. I would also contend, however, that at 
least superficial adherence to Aristotelian principles was necessary to be accepted as a 
genuine political scientist. Although some of Aristotle’s theses, the eternality of the 
universe, for example, were disregarded by medieval thinkers, others, such as the six-
fold classification of the good and corrupt forms of government, were almost required 
political dogma. Those who disagreed with them had to dissemble about their own ideas 
or manipulate Aristotle’s text to minimize any appearance of disagreement. So while the 
formal institutions of scientific enforcement were only partially established by the 
fourteenth century, adherence to the medieval Aristotelian paradigm was still being 
socially enforced. Thinkers had to conform (at least on the surface) or risk exclusion 
from the community. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Thomas Kuhn’s sociologically based approach to the history of science provides 
a fruitful lens through which to view medieval Aristotelianism. Science, as Kuhn 
describes it, is not a gradual accumulation of knowledge, but rather sporadic bursts of 
revolutionary thinking separated by periods of normal science or puzzle-solving. When 
this model of science is applied the study of politics, political science no longer appears 
quite so “young” in comparison with the natural sciences. Medieval Aristotelianism can 
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thus be viewed as one of the paradigms in the history of the study of politics. Its 
adherents shared technical language, basic assumptions about the political world, and a 
fundamental agreement on problem-choice. Political thinkers could not openly challenge 
the authority of Aristotle for fear of exclusion from the intellectual community. 
 Historians of political thought, such as Maurizio Viroli, have already noted that 
the translation of the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics in the late thirteenth century 
preceded an explosion of scholarly interest in politics. Focus shifted from the virtues of 
the ruler to “the science of the city.”46 Furthermore, a greater number of treatises become 
dedicated solely to the subject of politics, and particularly to constitutional 
arrangements. As Kuhn argued, it is often the adoption of a paradigm that solidifies a 
group of scholars into a scientific field. The reception of Aristotle seems to have done 
just that in the Middle Ages. 
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CHAPTER III 
ARISTOTLE AND THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF THE POLIS 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, medieval Aristotelianism was as much 
medieval as it was Aristotelian. Several of Aristotle’s premises about the nature of the 
cosmos could not be accepted if one wanted to remain an orthodox Christian. Some 
compromise was necessary. In addition to their Aristotelian education, medieval 
Aristotelians typically shared a Judeo-Christian religious background and Roman 
historical heritage. Yet, despite these multiple influences, Aristotle remains at the heart 
of this political paradigm. This is because Aristotle’s political and social works provided 
the core assumptions around which political science solidified as a discipline. The 
Politics presents politics as a natural and critical aspect of human life- one certainly 
worthy of study. In fact, Aristotle presents politics as the highest of all the practical 
sciences.  Having defined politics as “the science of the city,” Aristotle then offers a 
model for how it can be studied. The medieval Aristotelians took Aristotle’s claims on 
the centrality of politics to the good life to heart. They then tried to follow his lead in 
determining which type of constitution would best allow for human flourishing.  
In this chapter, I outline how Aristotle, and the Politics in particular, can provide 
a model for the scientific study of the polis. In Book IV of the Politics, Aristotle states 
that: “It belongs to the same science to study: what the best constitution is, that is to say, 
what it must be like if it is to be ideal, and if there were no external obstacles. Also, 
which constitution is appropriate for which city-states. For achieving the best 
 37 
constitutions is perhaps impossible for many…. [and] which constitution is best given 
certain assumptions.”47 Toward this end, much of the Politics is devoted to the analysis 
and evaluation of the different constitutional regimes. Aristotle collects data on existing 
constitutions, develops a scheme for their classification, selects his criteria for a “best” 
regime, and then chooses which regimes he thinks are best, both ideally and practically. 
In this chapter, I argue that this treatise thereby provides a blueprint for political science 
methodology that will be adopted by political thinkers in the late thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries.  
 
PREVIOUS WORK ON ARISTOTELIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 
 The claim that Aristotle offers his readers a “scientific” study of the social and 
political organization of ancient Greece is not an original one. Several scholars have 
noted that the empirical approach adopted by Aristotle provides the seeds of an early 
social science. Andrew Lintott points out that Aristotle’s approach to the study of 
politics contains multiple important empirical and normative elements: “He is not only 
seeking the best possible constitution, but also the best constitution possible in light of a 
city’s circumstances…. It is also true that he buttresses his general statements about 
human behavior by examples taken from history. However it is ultimately in the light of 
general ethical and political principles that the range of constitutions is judged.”48 Lintott 
agrees that the ultimate purpose of the Politics is the discovery of the best constitution, 
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although this task may not be as simple as it would at first appear. Aristotle is interested 
in both the theoretically best constitution and how the particular conditions of a given 
city will affect what is possible. He is interested in empirical explanations of how cities 
work as well as normative questions about how cities can best direct their lives of their 
citizens and serves the ends of justice.  Aristotle’s Politics, as Lintott presents it, 
provides a very thorough constitutional science that address both how politics works and 
how it should work.  
In his comparison of Aristotelian and Hobbesian political thought, Curtis 
Johnson recognizes the importance of Aristotle’s classification and evaluation of 
constitutions to his overall political thought, saying, “Aristotle’s idea of sovereignty is 
completely entangled with his constitutional taxonomy.”49 Johnson argues that one 
cannot understand Aristotle’s notion of sovereignty outside of this constitutional 
analysis, nor can one fully understand the constitutions without examining Aristotle’s 
sovereignty. Clifford Bates contends that the discussion of regimes at the beginning of 
Book III of the Politics is the “real beginning” of the work. Bates argues that, since 
Aristotle’s notion of the flaws in human nature prevents him from truly sanctioning the 
rule of the best man, the Politics actually endorses “democracy restrained by the rule of 
law” as the best system of government.50 Even if one disagrees with Bates’ conclusions 
on Aristotle’s feelings about democracy, one can still agree that constitutional questions 
form the heart of his political inquiry. Likewise, Stanford Cashdollar freely admits that 
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“the eight extant books of the Politics are ‘about the constitution’ [or] ‘about the best 
constitution.’51 Although these scholars are primarily interested in other aspects of 
Aristotle’s thought, they begin by establishing that constitutions play the central role in 
the Politics. 
 Looking not just at Aristotle’s thoughts on politics, but on his philosophy more 
broadly, Jonathan Lear argues that one of Aristotle’s key assumptions about human 
nature is an inherent drive to discover and understand things. This drive, in Lear’s 
reading of Aristotle, is satisfied first and foremost through the exercise of our senses: 
“That we take pleasure in the shear exercise of our sensory facilities is a sign that we do 
have a desire for knowledge.”52 Citing the Metaphysics, Lear argues both that human 
beings are driven to gain knowledge about their world through the use of sensory 
observation and that this knowledge is desired, not only for instrumental purposes, but 
for its own sake as well. Lear goes on to show how this understanding of how and why 
knowledge is obtained underlies Aristotle’s approaches to both the natural and social 
sciences. 
 Once again looking at Aristotle’s thought more broadly, Richard Rubenstein’s 
popular account of Aristotle’s approach to scientific inquiry and its impact on later 
thinkers praises Aristotle as a foundational figure in the history of science. Rubenstein 
defends Aristotle’ from modern critics, saying: 
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Aristotle’s cosmology was wrong, not ‘unscientific.’ Like the rest of his 
system it was based on principles, highly controversial at first, that later 
became accepted pillars of scientific method: for example, the ideas that 
the world our senses show us is real, not just a shadow of reality; that 
humans using their reason are capable of discovering general truths about 
the world; that understanding phenomena means comprehending 
relationships of cause and effect; and that natural processes are 
developmental, revealing to skillful inquirers orderly patterns of growth 
and change.53 
Thus, Aristotle can be considered a father of scientific inquiry in general and a 
proponent of methods that will eventually lead to the growth of modern science. 
While Lear and Rubenstein look at Aristotle’s philosophy of how we understand 
things (through empirical observations), Davis Toye examines what political material 
was actually available to Aristotle.  Toye disputes the traditional argument that Aristotle 
or his students would have traveled to large number of cities to collect their data, 
believing instead that Aristotle would have relied heavily on literary sources, as well as 
account from students and other travelers of their native cities. 54 Nevertheless, Toye 
does not dispute the idea that Aristotle’s political science was based upon observations, 
even if they were more often than not second hand. Similarly, Bernard Yack, agrees that 
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Aristotle is interested in finding the best form of government, but thinks modern scholars 
have often misinterpreted his understanding of politics, trying to force Aristotle into a 
communitarian mold. Yack argues that the “good life” in the polis still allows for a great 
deal of conflict and disagreement among the citizens.55 
 Even Leo Strauss contends that Aristotle should be considered the founder of the 
scientific study of politics, although his reasoning is slightly different: 
Not Socrates or Plato but Aristotle is truly the founder of political science: 
as one discipline, and by no means the most fundamental or the highest 
discipline, among a number of disciplines… Whereas Platonic teaching 
presents itself necessarily in dialogues, Aristotelian teaching presents itself 
necessarily in treatises. As regards political things, Aristotle acts directly as 
the teacher of indefinitely many legislators or statesmen whom he 
addresses collectively and simultaneously.56 
While the deductive reasoning of Plato lends itself to the give-and-take of a dialogue 
format, Aristotle makes observations, evaluates information and reaches conclusions.  
 Several of the above scholars emphasize the role that observing the realities of 
the political world plays in Aristotelian political science.  Though there may be some 
debates about where he obtained his data, scholars generally accept an empirical 
foundation as one of the hallmarks of Aristotle. The Politics asks what types of 
constitutions there are and what they look like in practice. These questions, along with 
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Aristotle’s attempts to answer them through systematic observations of political 
phenomena, have led many to grant him the title of first political scientist. However, it 
can be tempting, especially when one is comparing Aristotle’s work to that of Plato, to 
overemphasize the place of empirics in Aristotelian political thought. Although 
observation is key to understanding politics, the ultimate goal of Aristotelian political 
science is still to answer the normative question of which type of regime is best.  
Stephen Salkever highlights the complexity of Aristotle’s goal of both understanding 
how politics works and determining how it could work better: 
If social science were simply a matter of understanding the nomoi of a 
particular polis, it would not be difficult, ‘because it is not hard to have 
understanding concerning those things which nomoi say.’  But since the 
purpose of political inquiry is not merely interpretive understanding, but 
evaluation and criticism of nomoi in the light of the possibilities of a good 
or just political ordering or system of nomoi, it is not so easy.57 
Thus, the Aristotelian political scientist is not relieved of normative and ethical 
judgments. Rather, he or she must make these evaluations while keeping in mind 
what has been learned through the gathering of political observations. As Richard 
Bodeus argues, Aristotle shows a deep concern for how regimes work in the real 
world and how they can be improved and protected from corrupting forces. In this 
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way empirical and normative concerns are blended.58 Likewise, James Schall 
highlights Aristotle’s concern with “what is best” in politics, a question he feels 
modern political theorists neglect all too often.59  
 Likewise, Mary Nichols is very aware of the complexity of the aims of 
Aristotle’s political science. She argues that Aristotle is fundamentally concerned with 
how existing regimes can be improved so as to make them closer to an ideal. In order to 
achieve this goal, Aristotle must understand both what an ideal regime would look like 
and how the existing, imperfect regimes of the real world operate.60 Nichols objects to 
scholars like Ernest Barker, who contends that when Aristotle turns his attention to the 
analysis of existing regimes and how the statesmen can give their citizens what they 
desire he “lose[s] all ethical connection.”61Quite to the contrary, Nichols argues that 
Aristotle’s investigations into the imperfect regimes are driven by his desire to 
understand how realistic improvements can be made in even the most corrupt 
constitutions: 62 
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Aristotle is not advocating, as it might appear, that the statesmen study and 
serve the variety of existing regimes, in contrast to those idealists who seek 
the single regime that is best. Far from serving the variety of regimes, 
regardless of their ends, he studies that variety precisely because each 
regime can be transformed by degrees into a version of that single 
arrangement.63 
Nichols firmly advocates the idea that empirical studies of politics are not antithetical to 
Aristotle’s overall normative aims; in fact, they are often necessary. 
 Multiple scholars have acknowledged Aristotle to be a founding figure in 
scientific methodology, advocating a process of observation and inference of causal 
relationships. In the realm of politics, this means that Aristotle wants to observe the 
different poleis and see how their organization affects the lives of those within them. Yet 
for Aristotle, political science does not end here. From these empirical observations, 
Aristotle seeks to draw normative conclusions both about which regime would be best 
ideally and which is best in practical terms.  Although scholars focus on different aspects 
of Aristotle’s method and conclusions, there is still fairly widespread agreement on this 
basic outline of his political methodology. 
 
ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS AND THE BEST REGIME 
Aristotle begins his most famous political work by positing that every 
community comes together for the sake of some good. Of these, the city-state is the 
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highest because it encompasses authority over all the other goods in human life.64 
Politics, for Aristotle, is not the necessary evil of the neo-Platonic/Augustinian tradition. 
Rather, it is a necessary and natural part of the good human life: “For as a human being 
is the best of all animals when perfected, so when separated from LAW and JUSTICE he 
is the worst of all.”65 This elevated role for political activity is one of the hallmarks of 
Aristotle and his followers in the ancient, medieval and modern world. 
 Politics is not only posited to be important, but to constitute its own form of 
knowledge. As Aristotle states in Book I, Chapter I, the city is not just a very large 
household, and politics is more than an extended form of household rule: “Those, then, 
who think the positions of Statesman, King, Household Manager, and Master of slaves 
are the same are not correct. For they hold that each of these differs not in kind, but only 
in whether the subjects ruled are few or many… But these claims are not true.”66 
Aristotle then contends that this will be obvious to the reader once we complete a 
thorough investigation of cities and their composite parts. 
 Returning to the theme that “[the city] comes to be for the sake of living, but it 
remains in existence for the sake of living well,” the Politics begins a discussion of the 
many different necessary components of the city. These include the various trades, 
commerce, the acquisition of wealth and the management of slaves. Most importantly, 
Aristotle discusses the household and rule within it. Households are the building blocks 
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of which cities are made. Thus, although household management is distinct from 
politics, it is still a critical aspect of the successful political community. 
 In Book II of the Politics, Aristotle begins his systematic study of constitutions in 
an effort to find the ideal regime. The first step in this process, however, is tearing apart 
Plato’s ideal city from the Republic. Aristotle launches his primary attack on Plato’s 
assertion that women and children should be held in common, contending that the 
system would be both detrimental to the common good (people would not care for 
collective goods and children as conscientiously as they would their own) and 
impractical (people would still suspect which children were theirs). Aristotle also points 
out that the same group of guardians is constantly in power in the Republic, a situation 
he sees as potentially dangerous, especially if the guardians become unhappy with their 
lot.67 Having thus dismissed the notion that Plato has already found the best regime, 
Aristotle begins his own investigation in earnest. 
 With assistance from his students, Aristotle had assembled a collection of over 
one hundred fifty constitutions from surrounding city-states (including some that were 
proposed but never implemented).68 The second half of Book II is devoted to examining 
and evaluating a number of these. Aristotle generally describes each of the different 
systems of rule and then points out potential flaws and contradictions in them.69 
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Particular attention is paid to who holds political power in the city. A wide variety of 
constitutional arrangements are included, each one analyzed with a critical eye. 
 Aristotle goes about his investigations in a fairly organized manner. First, he 
explains, one must find a way of classifying the different regime types: “The next thing 
to investigate is whether we should suppose that there is just one kind of constitution or 
several, and, if there are several, what they are, how many they are, and how they 
differ.”70 Aristotle argues that regimes can vary both by who holds political power and 
by whether they exercise said power for the common good or for their private benefit. 
Thus, Aristotle frames his famous six-fold scheme for classifying both good and bad 
constitutions: 
Since ‘constitution’ and ‘governing class’ signify the same thing, and the 
governing class is the authoritative element in any city-state, and the 
authoritative element must either be one person, or few, or many, then 
whenever the one, the few, or the many rule for the common benefit, these 
constitutions must be correct. But if they aim at the private benefit, whether 
of the one, the few or the multitude, they are deviations.71 
The result is that each city can be classified as a monarchy, a tyranny, an aristocracy, an 
oligarchy, a polity, or a democracy. 
 The remainder of Book III is spent weighing the benefits (and failures) of these 
different systems of government. Aristotle wants to find the one that is the most just and 
conducive to human flourishing. Although his basic scheme allows for only six types of 
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constitutions, Aristotle acknowledges that there can be variations on these types, as 
when he compares the different forms of kingship in chapter fourteen, where Aristotle 
lists no less than five variations on this simplest constitutional form.72 Aristotle 
concludes that the best government is one where a person or persons of outstanding 
virtue rule for the benefit of the whole; yet it is more important to have good laws than a 
good ruler. 73 
 Book IV opens with an extended statement on the aims of political science and 
what areas of study it should cover: 
It is clear that it belongs to the same science to study: [1] What the best 
constitution is, that is to say, what it must be like if it is to be most ideal, 
and if they were no external obstacles. Also [2] which constitution is 
appropriate for which city-states. For achieving the best constitution is 
perhaps impossible for many; and so neither the unqualifiedly best nor the 
one that is best in the circumstances should be neglected by the good 
legislator and true statesman. [3] Which constitution is best given certain 
assumptions. For a statesman must be able to study how any given 
constitution might initially come into existence, and how, once in 
existence, it might be preserved for the longest time… Besides all these 
things, a statesmen should know [4] which constitution is most appropriate 
for all city-states.74 
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Thus, Aristotle is concerned with both what regime is best in theory and what is 
practically possible in a given situation. Normative conclusions, for Aristotle, must be 
supported with evidence from political life. In this way, he breaks from Plato. 
Furthermore, while Aristotle includes a fairly broad range of topics in his science of 
politics, they are all rooted in questions of constitutional design. Although issues such as 
the personal virtue of rulers and the economic well-being of the city were certainly of 
concern to Aristotle, they are not, strictly speaking, political science. 
 Aristotle resumes his investigation by asking what really distinguishes these 
constitutional forms from one another: 
The reason why there are several constitutions is that every city-state has 
several parts… all city-states are composed of households… within this 
multitude there have to be some who are rich, some who are poor, and 
some who are in the middle; and that of the rich and the poor, the one 
possessing weapons and the other without weapons. We also see that the 
people comprise a farming part, a trading part, and a vulgar craftsman 
part…Some times all of these parts participate in the constitution, 
sometimes fewer of them, sometimes more.75 
The fundamental divisions within the city, for Aristotle, are class-based, and the 
distinctions between the constitutions lie in which of these elements (or what 
combination thereof) holds power. 
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 So which of these constitutions is best? Ideally, an individual of supreme virtue, 
i.e., a true king, would rule over the city to everyone’s benefit; however, Aristotle 
acknowledges that this is unlikely to work in practice.76 In examining the constitutions 
of real life cities, Aristotle concludes that most are either oligarchies, democracies, or 
(most frequently) some combination of the two.77 It is this mixture of democracy and 
oligarchy, called polity, that Aristotle endorses as the best practical regime. This regime 
typically combines elements of democratic law (no property requirements for holding 
office) with elements of oligarchic law (officials are elected rather than chosen by lot). 
Polity thus satisfies Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean, since virtue does not lie in the 
extremes.78 
 Aristotle begins Book IV, Chapter 11 by reiterating the purpose of his political 
science, particularly as it relates to the practical side of politics: 
What is the best constitution and what is the best for most city-states and 
most human beings, judging neither by virtue that is beyond the reach of 
ordinary people, nor by a kind of education that requires natural gifts and 
resources that depend on luck, nor by the ideal constitution, but by a life that 
most people can share and a constitution in which most city-states can 
participate?79 
He then continues the task of answering this question as best he can. The best practical 
constitution relies not only on balancing the interests of the rich and the poor, but 
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requires a strong middle class as well: “Of all citizens, those in the middle survive best 
in city-states. For neither do they desire other people’s property as the poor do, nor do 
other people desire theirs… It is clear, therefore, that the political community that 
depends on those in the middle is best too, and that city-states can be well governed 
where those in the middle are numerous and stronger.”80 It is through mixing and 
moderation that one can achieve a good polis, even in an imperfect world. Aware that 
the political world and those who inhabit it cannot always meet ideal expectations, 
Aristotle is still concerned with giving them the best that is possible for them.  
Although no fan of democracy, Aristotle acknowledges that including some 
democratic elements in a mixed regime can improve its stability and effectiveness. The 
best laws will do a city no good if no one obeys them, and including more of the 
population in the political process is one way to increase the likelihood that citizens will 
obey the law. 81 Again, one can see that Aristotle is deeply interested in different 
constitutions and how they work (or fail to work) in practice. This theme continues 
through Aristotle’s discussion of specific cities and their constitutions in Book VI. His 
scientific investigations into the effects of constitutional structures, however, do not 
signal a break from his earlier normative project. Aristotle is still concerned with what is 
best, but he also wants to understand how existing political bodies can be made better.82 
 As the above analysis shows, Aristotle’s Politics can provide the outline for a 
political science of comparative constitutional studies. Aristotle classifies cities 
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according to who rules and tries to determine which of these systems is best. Yet, this is 
not as straightforward a task as it might seem. Aristotle is deeply concerned with the 
practical side of politics. He wants to find not just the ideal best regime, but the regime 
that will function best in the real world. For this reason, he observes the workings of 
various constitutional systems and their effects on the citizens who live under them. 
Aristotle’s political science methodology combines normative and empirical elements in 
an effort to find the best constitution. 
 
HOW DOES ARISTOTLE ANSWER HIS OWN QUESTION? 
 As I am arguing that Aristotle’s primary concern in the Politics is the discovery 
of the best sort of regime, it is natural that one would wonder what conclusion he comes 
to. In my own reading, I see Aristotle endorsing monarchy in an ideal world, but 
accepting a mixed regime (with a heavy dose of aristocracy) as a more practical 
solution.83 [cite] Interpreters of Aristotle in the many centuries since he wrote the 
Politics have often disagreed about this issue, claiming Aristotle’s endorsement of 
political systems ranging from monarchy to empire to republicanism to 
communitarianism to deliberative democracy. Aristotle’s text is in many ways 
ambiguous enough to allow a variety of different readings. 
 In particular, recent scholars, such as Andrew Lindsey and Paul Nieuwenburg, 
have debated what Aristotle might have to say to modern proponents of democracy. 
Some try to defend him from accusations of elitism, arguing that Aristotle offers 
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“qualified” support for democracy in the polis.84 Others are certainly more reluctant to 
read any support for democracy in Aristotle’s work. 85 One of the more common (and 
perhaps one of the more fruitful) approaches is to claim that regardless of Aristotle’s 
actual feeling about democracy, his views on human nature and the proper role of 
politics in human life provide some valuable lessons for contemporary deliberative 
democrats.86 Despite more than two thousand years of analysis, Aristotle’s commentary 
on the different forms of constitutions still provides ample fodder for scholars of 
political theory. These debates are, however, largely outside the scope of this project, 
except to reaffirm that Aristotle’s analysis of what regime type is best is still a central 
matter of concern in Aristotelian political theory. The medieval thinkers whose work I 
am analyzing, like their modern counterparts, saw multiple possible answers to the 
question of Aristotle’s preferred constitution. Thus, whether one believes Aristotle to be 
a monarchist, republican, or deliberative democrat, his influence on political 
methodology in the later Middle Ages need not be denied. 
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OTHER TOPICS ADDRESSED IN THE POLITICS 
 My reading of Aristotle places the question of regime type (both ideal and 
practical) at the heart of the Politics; however, not everyone accepts that this is 
Aristotle’s central political concern. Alternative accounts have proposed defining the 
nature of the city or the nature of the citizen as the key to Aristotelian political science.87 
Others argue that Aristotle is either continuing Plato’s project of finding the meaning of 
justice or offering a critique of the Platonic project, although the latter would certainly at 
least be related to my account of the aims of the Politics.88 
 With any thinker as complex and multi-faceted as Aristotle it is a nearly 
impossible to determine with any certainty which topic they thought to be the most 
important. Yet few would deny that Aristotle thought the question of determining the 
best regime to be a critical one, as Aristotle said so himself in Book I of the Politics.89 
Furthermore, Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics reaffirms this supposition:  
Then let us study the collected political systems, to see from them what sorts 
of things preserve and destroy cities, and political systems of different types; 
and what causes some cities to conduct politics well, and some badly. For 
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when we have studied these questions, we will perhaps grasp better what 
sort of political system is best; how each political should be organized so as 
to be best; and what laws and habits it should follow.90 
Even if one does not accept the centrality of constitutional evaluation in Aristotle’s 
political investigations, medieval political thinkers still interpreted his work as such, as 
the following chapters will demonstrate. 
 Another issue over which scholars of Aristotle frequently come to blows is 
whether is he is more concerned with which constitution is best unqualifiedly or with 
which is best, given the particular circumstances of a city. Is Aristotle a realist or an 
idealist? One point of contention is whether Aristotle’s conception of the “natural” city 
still allows room for conflict. Although few scholars will actually claim that Aristotle is 
a utopian, they seem fond of accusing other scholars of reading him as such. To what 
extent does Aristotle’s politics account for the disagreement? Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Thomas W. Smith both see Aristotle’s ideal polis as one in which conflict over the 
common good is minimal at least.91 This approach has been criticized by those scholars 
who see Aristotle as making ample allowance for conflict within the political 
community.92  
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These debates about the extent to which Aristotle’s political theory takes conflict 
and disagreement into account stem from a larger dispute about Aristotle’s methodology. 
While some see Aristotle as continuing a fairly Platonic project of finding the best ideal 
regime, others argue that his interest in finding the best practical regime signals a break 
from his former teacher.93 In my mind, this conflict is rather overblown. Aristotle is 
interested in both the best ideal regime and the best possible regime, and these two goals 
are in no way conflicting. As Robert Barlett points out while defending Aristotle’s from 
modern critics: 
The ‘imagined’ republic or ‘best regime’ of Books VII and VIII of 
Aristotle’s Politics…shows Aristotle to be in no sense naïve or that he 
knows full well the ways of the world; that although Aristotle does indeed 
look to moral virtue as the standard by which to judge… a political 
community, he is not only aware of the difficulties of that standard but 
attempts in a number of ways to cope with them. 94 
Aristotle is ultimately concerned with both ideal politics and the workings of politics in 
the real world. There is no conflict. Likewise, he is able to combine a deep interest in 
normative questions with thorough empirical investigation.  
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 Thus Aristotle is a realist, and yet is still interested in the ideal regime. He tries to 
understand how politics works and how constitutions affect the lives of those that live 
under them in order to determine which is best ideally. And he seeks to understand the 
ideal constitution and how it would work in order to determine how real world political 
systems could be improved. These tasks are complimentary, not contradictory.95 
Medieval thinkers looking to Aristotle as a model could emphasize either aspect of his 
political science. Although many focused on the “ideal” constitution, like Aristotle, they 
still did so bearing in mind the realities of political life.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 From this chapter, one should be able to see how the Politics can provide a 
model for the conduct of political science. Aristotle approaches the study of the city 
driven by the normative goals of identifying which regime is best and determining how 
existing cities could be made better. Yet these conclusions are always based on his real 
world political observations. Normative and empirical approaches to politics are not in 
conflict for Aristotle. While addressing both normative and empirical concerns, 
Aristotle’s political science focuses on questions of regime type. The central question 
addressed in the Politics is, “What regime is best?,” and this question is approached 
from both idealist and realist perspectives. The resulting “comparative constitutional 
studies” forms one prototype for political science research. Thinkers in the Middle Ages 
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who were exposed to Aristotle’s political and social thought embraced this model of 
political science and made it their own.  
 Although questions of regime type, in my reading, form the heart of the Politics, 
they are not the only issues addressed in this text. Scholars have offered multiple 
alternative objectives for Aristotle’s writing, including discovering the meaning of 
justice or the nature of citizenship. Yet even if one disagrees with my assessment of 
Aristotle’s primary purpose, the following chapters will hopefully show that medieval 
Aristotelians read him as such. The reintroduction into the West of Aristotle’s major 
moral and political works brought the subject of politics to the forefront of many 
scholars’ minds. Political science came to be viewed as a distinct and important 
discipline. When medieval thinkers themselves took up the study of the city and its 
workings, they turned to the Politics as their model. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE ARISTOTELIAN TRANSITION 
 
 
As the previous chapter shows, Aristotle’s Politics can provide a model for a 
political science centered on comparative constitutional studies. However, the political 
Aristotelianism of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries did not result solely and 
immediately from the reintroduction of this one text. Aristotle’s model of political 
science took time to gain adherents. Furthermore, the emergence of Aristotelian political 
philosophy in the west was a gradual process. Roman, Christian, Jewish, and Arab 
sources had provided indirect access to the ideas of this ancient thinker long before 
Moerbeke’s Latin translation was completed. And most of Aristotle’s other important 
works became available first. Much of the contents of the Politics would not, therefore, 
have been a complete surprise to its medieval readers.96 How, then, can one try to 
determine how strong an effect the Politics actually had on medieval political thought? 
This chapter will explore the mid thirteenth-century political thinker Brunetto 
Latini and his contribution to the development of western political thought. Latini 
occupies a particularly interesting place in this history, writing on the brink of the 
reintroduction of Aristotle’s Politics in the thirteenth century. Latini was born circa 1220 
and was best known in his lifetime as a teacher and scholar of rhetoric in his native 
Florence. His most famous political work, Les Livres du Tresor, was completed around 
1260. At that time, Latini was quite familiar with the text of the Nicomachean Ethics 
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(translated in 1247) but had no access to that of the Politics (the complete translation of 
which was made available sometime between 1260 and 1265). Thus, Latini’s writing 
provides the scholar of the Middle Ages with a unique opportunity. This chapter will 
examine Les Livres du Tresor to determine to what extent Latini was able to follow an 
Aristotelian political paradigm without any direct access to the Politics itself. This 
should shed some light on the process by which Aristotle’s model of political science 
was adopted and the specific role of the Politics therein. 
After exploring Latini’s work, this chapter will briefly discuss the process 
through which the Latin text of the Politics became available in the West and how it was 
initially received. It will look at the work of some of the early commentators and their 
attempts to make sense out of William of Moerbeke’s unwieldy translation. I then make 
the case that these commentaries, while important to the development of the Aristotelian 
paradigm, do not constitute Aristotelian political science themselves. These early 
thinkers are busy defining and defending Aristotle’s political ideas, not using his 
framework to make their own political statements.  
 
BRUNETTO LATINI: PREHUMANIST AND DEFENDER OF LIBERTY 
 Scholarship on the political thought of the later Middle Ages far too often 
neglects to offer any serious consideration of the Florentine republican, Brunetto Latini. 
Those who do mention his work often present him simply as a mere precursor of the 
more thorough Italian humanists of the Renaissance or limit their interest to Latini’s 
possible influence on his protégé, Dante Alighieri (or to Dante’s placement of Latini 
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among the sodomites in the Divine Comedy).97 While these two veins of scholarship are 
not without merit, Latini’s political thought deserves more substantial consideration on 
its own.  
One reoccurring theme in the scholarship on Latini is the role he played in both 
reviving interest in classical texts and in connecting these ancient ideas to contemporary 
politics. It should there fore not be surprising that Quentin Skinner touches on both 
aspects in his discussion of Latini’s work. He first notes Latini’s extensive use of 
classical, particularly Roman, sources in his discussions of politics and rhetoric. 
According to Skinner, these classical sources helped to “enrich” the tradition of political 
writing inherited the early and high Middle Ages.98 Brunetto Latini’s other contribution 
comes in the form of a remarkable defense of republican liberty. This includes both a 
resounding preference for popular rule over that of kings or princes and an urging of the 
citizenry to respect the traditional republican values and put the common welfare ahead 
of their private interest.99 For Latini, Skinner argues, this emphasis on virtue leads him to 
value a potential leader’s personal qualities rather than wealth or social status, 
reinforcing his republican ideology.100 
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Like Skinner, other scholars have acknowledged the important role Latini played 
in returning classical texts to a place of importance in late medieval learning. According 
to Charles Davis, “The appearance of Brunetto Latini was accompanied by a distinct 
advance in general culture and by a new enthusiasm for the ancient authors.”101 As 
Skinner pointed out, this shift toward classical authors was not without substantive 
effect. Latini was a teacher of rhetoric who held to the Roman ideal that the rhetorician 
was one who led his fellow citizens toward a more just and virtuous political life.102 
Maurizio Viroli also views Brunetto Latini as playing a critical role in the return to 
classical ideas about politics in the later Middle Ages (despite his writing before the 
reintroduction of Aristotle’s Politics). Viroli contrasts this ancient/medieval view, in 
which politics is about ruling according to justice and right reason, with the more realist 
views of the early modern period.103 
Similarly, Jerreld Seigel argues that Latini’s study of classical sources, and of 
classical rhetoric in particular, shapes his political views. Seigel finds Latini to be an 
important predecessor of later humanist thinkers, but also cautions against overplaying 
the similarities between medieval and Renaissance rhetoricians:  
Latini makes rhetoric the foundation of politics. Moreover, he specifically 
embraces the ideal of the combination of rhetoric and philosophy, making 
use of Cicero’s De inventione. It would seem therefore that many of the 
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humanists’ deepest interests had surprisingly clear precedents. Nevertheless, 
the culture of a man like Latini was very different from that of Petrarch.104 
For Seigel, although Latini borrowed ideas from classical thinkers like Cicero and 
Aristotle, he still lacked the historical appreciation of their work that would appear in the 
Renaissance. Likewise, James Blythe points out the ways in which Latini resembles later 
medieval thinkers, while still maintaining a vigilant awareness of how he is not like 
modern (or even later medieval) political theorists.105 
 Brunetto’s political theory is not focused solely on the importance of justice in 
government but offers a form of republicanism with a strong democratic element, as his 
preferred constitutional form. John Hine Mundy notes that Latini is one of several late 
medieval thinkers who are concerned with including “the people” in the politics. 
According to Mundy, Latini offers “a stronger democratic voice” than Ptolemy of Lucca 
and continually asserts the superiority of republican rule over other forms.106 Marvin 
Becker similarly places Latini among those medieval thinkers who asserted that an 
individual’s character and actions were truer marks of nobility than one’s birth. He thus 
takes the merchant values of his native Florence into the political arena, where he argues 
against aristocratic dominance.107  
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Although admitting that Latini’s Book of the Tresaure does not provide a true 
“political theory,” John Najemy still think that Latini offers important political lessons 
for the citizens of Florence. According to Najemy, Brunetto Latini viewed politics as an 
“art” and its practitioners as “artisans.” Latini then combines his understanding of 
Aristotelian virtue ethics with his experiences in the Florentine Commune to come to his 
own conclusions on how the political artisan should operate.108 Najemy provides one of 
the more thorough investigations of Latini’s political thought in the English language 
tradition, though he is careful not to exaggerate Latini’s originality or prowess as a 
philosopher. Although Najemy certainly give Latini more attention that most scholars, 
his conclusion still focuses on how Latini and his writing may have shaped later 
Florentines. 
Although full-scale studies of Brunetto Latini as a political thinker seem to be 
rare (especially in the English language), he is still frequently cited by scholars as a early 
advocate of participatory politics. For example, Jean Campbell’s study of the political 
ideals of Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s frescos cite Brunetto Latini as the primary literary 
inspiration.109 These studies are generally not interested in Latini himself, but in the 
ways he prefigures the republican and humanist ideas of the Italian Renaissance. In a 
somewhat similar vein, Charles Davis offers Latini as an example of how Hans Baron’s 
theories about the shift from medieval to Renaissance thinking were, at the very least, 
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off by at least a century. According to Davis, Latini clearly recognized the centrality of 
political life that Baron identifies as a hallmark of later thinkers, “For Brunetto, 
education in general, and rhetorical education in particular, was a preparation for 
politics.”110 
 Cary Nederman has criticized the tendency in Latini scholarship to focus solely 
on the classical sources that influenced Latini’s republican thought. Nederman points out 
that, in addition to classical texts on the virtues of republican government, Latini also 
found inspiration in the commercial environment of northern Italy. Latini not only 
contradicts Aristotle to say that commercial interactions can form the basis of just and 
friendly relations between citizens, he actually makes economic activity the hallmark of 
the good city.111 According to Nederman, Brunetto Latini focuses on the material needs 
of citizens and asks what type of government can best meet those needs; his answer is a 
republic similar to those found in the cities of northern Italy. 
 
LI LIVRES DOU TRESOR 
Having looked at previous scholarship on Brunetto Latini and his impact on later 
thinkers, this chapter will now turn to the text of Li Livres dou Tresor itself. How well 
does it fit the model of Aristotelian political science that I have previously laid out? 
Does Latini employ Aristotelian political language in his arguments? Does he attempt to 
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classify cities based on their constitutional arrangements? Above all, does Latini engage 
in the medieval Aristotelian project of trying to determine which of these constitutional 
systems is best? 
The primary source for Brunetto Latini’s political thought is his encyclopedic Li 
Livres dou Tresor, or The Book of the Treasure. This compendium was intended to offer 
a one-stop source for human knowledge. Book I covers the natural history of the world, 
clearly a very broad topic and one that Brunetto took to include both the natural sciences 
and the history of human civilization from Biblical creation to his present day. Book II 
covers the subject of morality and is taken mostly from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 
Book III is where political issues really come into play; here, Latini delves into the 
subjects of politics and rhetoric. It is Book III that has helped Latini earn his reputation 
both as a scholar of Ciceronian rhetoric and as a defender of one of the most inclusive 
notions of citizenship and communal government found in the Middle Ages.  
Writing just on the cusp of the reintroduction of Aristotle’s Politics, Latini 
provides a very interesting case study. His Li Livres dou Tresor can help show us just 
how much of the Aristotelian paradigm was available before the Politics and what 
elements were still missing. In some ways, Latini shares a great deal with the Christian 
Aristotelians of the later thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Much of the moral and 
political vocabulary used is the same. For example, in Book II, Brunetto discusses the 
virtues; the list he provides includes the standard virtues of medieval Aristotelianism: 
Courage, Temperance, Magnificence, Magnanimity, etc. Furthermore, when giving a 
general definition of virtue, Latini turns to the doctrine of the mean, explaining: “Every 
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artisan strives to maintain the middle ground in his art and to abandon the extremes, that 
is, too little or too much, and moral virtue is in those things in which too little and too 
much are despised and the middle is worthy of our esteem; therefore, virtue is a state of 
character through will… and it resides in the middle according to us.”112 Thus, the 
language that Latini uses when discussing the moral virtues is fundamentally 
Aristotelian in nature. This is not surprising, given that Book II of Li Livres dou Tresor 
is at times little more than a summary of and commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics.  
The use of Aristotelian terminology is not, however, limited to the discussion of 
moral virtues. Latini’s breakdown of constitutional regimes also seems to be at least 
partly derived from his understanding of Aristotle. In Chapter 44 of Book II he describes 
the types of lordship: “There are three types of lordship: one of kings, the second of 
men, and the third of communes, which is best of all. Each type has its opposite, for the 
king’s lordship has its opposite in the lordship of the tyrant…”113 While the description 
that Brunetto gives of how each type of good regime can decay does not entirely match 
that of Aristotle (the rule of “good men” becomes a commune rather than an oligarchy), 
his notion of the different types of good and bad regimes seems remarkably similar in 
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form to that found in other medieval Aristotelians. Constitutions are classified according 
to who rules and whether they do so virtuously. Despite not having direct access to the 
Politics, Brunetto Latini seems to have employed much of the technical language of 
political Aristotelianism, one important criterion for membership in the political 
Aristotelian “scientific community.” 
 Additionally, Brunetto Latini shares with Aristotle (and with several medieval 
Aristotelians) the idea that human knowledge could be divided into the theoretical and 
practical disciplines.114 This division in knowledge is paralleled by a division in virtues. 
As Latini writes, “The very first knowledge is theoretical, and this is the very science 
which teaches us first the subject, that is, to know and be acquainted with the nature of 
all things celestial and terrestrial.”115 Latini then goes on to discuss theology, physics, 
and mathematics and their place in human learning.116 In regard to practical knowledge, 
Brunetto states: “The second branch of philosophy is the practical one, and it teaches us 
what to do and what not to do.”117 Among the practical subjects, politics is “without a 
doubt… the highest wisdom and most noble profession there is among men.”118 This 
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division of learning is consistent with medieval Aristotelian views, though not a 
conclusive test of whether a thinker was, in fact, “Aristotelian” as I am using the term.119 
 Like Ptolemy of Lucca, who will be discussed at length in Chapter V, Brunetto 
Latini uses this Aristotelian language to make arguments that support the republican 
traditions of his native Italy. These republican arguments were often not particularly 
Aristotelian in their thrust. In particular, Latini saw the mechanical arts as a vital and 
valuable part of the civic community, a claim that Aristotle would not necessarily 
support. Likewise, commercial interactions are praised as avenues for the exercise of 
virtues, such as justice; as Brunetto writes: “Citizens who live together in a city serve 
one another, for if a man needs something another person has, he receives it and gives 
him his reward and his payment according to the quality of the thing until there is a just 
middle ground between them.”120 Cary Nederman has discussed how Latini’s 
“commercial republicanism” contrasts with Aristotle and displays a “valorization of 
mechanical occupations” evident in medieval literature from the twelfth century 
onwards.121 Thus, one can see that Brunetto Latini was just as comfortable citing 
Aristotle while arguing a contrary position as Ptolemy of Lucca would be half a century 
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later.122 Latini’s disagreement with Aristotle on political matters, such as who should be 
counted as a full citizen and how political decisions can best be made, does not exclude 
him from the category of “medieval Aristotelian” under my definition. 
 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Les Livres dou Tresor is a compendium and 
contains information on a variety of subjects. Many of his discussions of politics in Book 
III concentrate on the particulars of how one should administer the city. Topics such as 
how the new executive should be informed that he has won the election and how he 
should travel to the city and take his oath of office are discussed at length.123 Although 
these subjects may not typically be considered the stuff of serious political philosophy, 
throughout Brunetto’s discussion, he continually draws attention to the fact that the 
lord’s power is granted by the people and is only legitimate when exercised in 
accordance with the local laws of the city. 124 
 While I have shown that Brunetto Latini was able to deploy a great deal of 
Aristotelian political language despite not having direct access to the text of the Politics, 
the question still looms: Did Brunetto Latini pursue an Aristotelian research agenda? 
According to the definition of medieval Aristotelianism offered earlier in this 
dissertation, one must determine whether the main goal of Brunetto’s work was to 
establish what is the best sort of regime. Constitutional questions formed the heart of 
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later Aristotelian political science and are, not surprisingly, also present in Latini’s work. 
In Book II, Chapter 44, Brunetto Latini writes: “There are three types of lordship: one of 
kings, the second of men, and the third of communes, which is the best of all.”125 
Although this sentence is not equal to the lengthy defense of republicanism found in a 
thinker such as Ptolemy of Lucca, the question of constitutional form is still present. 
Likewise, in Book III Bruentto Latini again briefly takes up the subjects of different 
types of regimes:  
These [governments of cities] are of two types, one of which exists in France 
and in other countries, who are subject to the lordship of kings and of other 
perpetual princes who sell the office of magistrate and give it to those who 
seek it... The other kind is in Italy, for the citizens and the city-dwellers and 
the communities of cities elect as magistrates and lords those they consider 
to be better and more profitable to the common good of the city and all its 
subjects...126 
Here, one can see Latini’s general supposition that those cities whose people elect their 
leaders will be better ruled. Yet, once again, the discussion of constitutional types and 
their merits is rather brief. 
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In contrast to an earlier thinker, such as John of Salisbury,127 Brunetto Latini 
does not take one regime form for granted, but rather considers which is best. Still, I 
think it would be disingenuous to claim that determining the best type of constitution 
was the overriding aim of Li Livres dou Tresor.  As the following chapters will show, 
mature Aristotelian political scientists focus more clearly on this single topic. For 
example, De regimine principum (at least from the point that Ptolemy takes over 
authorship) provides an organized line of reasoning for why republicanism is the best 
form of government and why Republican Rome, in particular, is the best example 
thereof. Li Livres dou Tresor, on the other hand, is a more rambling text, addressing 
many questions, political and otherwise.128 Although Latini does discuss constitutional 
forms and chooses one he thinks is best, constitutional forms are not so clearly the heart 
of his argument, as they are in Ptolemy’s text. The Aristotelian constitutional question is, 
therefore, present but not central in his treatise. 
 
DOES BRUNETTO LATINI QUALIFY AS A MEDIEVAL ARISTOTELIAN? 
 Based on the above analysis, I would conclude that Brunetto Latini represents an 
transitional stage in the Aristotelianization of political thinking in the thirteenth century. 
In some ways, Li Livres dou Tresor resembles later works of the Aristotelian political 
tradition. Much of the moral and political language, for example, is derived from that 
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found in Aristotle and his commentators. Likewise, Latini utilizes the division of 
learning into the theoretical and practical disciplines, a feature of medieval Aristotelian 
thinking that is not even found in the early fourteenth-century theory of Ptolemy of 
Lucca. Overall, Brunetto Latini’s Li Livres dou Tresor contains a remarkable number of 
Aristotelian elements, especially considering it was written before the dissemination of 
Aristotle’s Politics in the west.  
Regarding the research question of Li Livres dou Tresor, my results are mixed. 
Brunetto Latini does address the issue of which type of constitutional regime is best and 
gives his readers a clear answer (communal government). This represents a significant 
step. Latini feels a need to discuss the different constitutions and offer his opinion on the 
best one. Brunetto Latini’s constitutional theory seems thin, at best. There is 
comparatively little discussion of why communal government is the best form or of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the various constitutional forms. Furthermore, saying that 
finding the best constitution is the primary aim of Li Livres dou Tresor would be a 
stretch. Latini considers many problems in this work, and his discussion of constitutions 
is only one small part. Unlike later medieval Aristotelians, arguing for his preferred 
constitutional form is not the central task of Latini’s work. 
 This chapter has shown how, with some help from the philosophy of science 
literature, one can gain better leverage on the question of who in the Middle Ages was 
really an Aristotelian. Li Livres dou Tresor falls into an intermediate category, 
addressing the primary Aristotelian political question, but not making that its 
overarching aim, all while employing Aristotelian political language. Through this 
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analysis I hope to have not only demonstrated how an Aristotelian political “research 
agenda” is a useful way of looking at medieval Aristotelianism, but also to have shed 
some greater light on the specific role of the Politics in transforming western political 
thought in the Middle Ages. Though much of the language of Aristotelian political 
argument seems to have been available prior to the dissemination of William of 
Moerbeke’s translation of the Politics, it does seem that the Politics played a key role in 
making the constitutional issue the primary (if not the only) legitimate question of later 
medieval Aristotelian political theory and giving medieval thinkers a clear model for 
how to conduct political science. 
 
THE TRANSLATION OF THE POLITICS AND ITS IMMEDIATE RECEPTION 
 Around the time that Latini completed his Li Livres dou Tresor, the complete 
Latin translation of Aristotle’s Politics was made available to western Europe. This 
happened no later than 1265. Medieval thinkers, already familiar with much of 
Aristotle’s thought, were eager to read the Philosopher’s views on political matters. 
However, the availability of a Latin Politics did not result in the immediate adoption of 
an Aristotelian paradigm for the study of politics. William of Moerbeke’s translation of 
the Politics was problematic in several respects. It was overly literal, contained many 
Grecisms and was generally difficult to understand. As Jean Dunbabin has put it, in 
Moerbeke’s translation, “Accuracy is more than counterbalanced by unintelligibility.”129 
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The initial hurdle of simply making sense of the text left many of the first generation of 
political thinkers exposed to Aristotle with more questions than answers. Furthermore, 
there was trepidation about the appropriateness of relying on a pagan authority.130 
 It should therefore not be surprising that many of the earliest written responses to 
the Politics in the medieval tradition are more concerned with determining what 
Aristotle was trying to say himself, rather than engaging in a theoretical critique of his 
text or the application of his scientific methodology to contemporary political problems. 
This first generation of commentaries includes those of Albert the Great, Thomas 
Aquinas’s partial commentary, and Peter of Auvergne’s continuation. For much of their 
text, the Politics is simply paraphrased in more comprehensible Latin. Additionally 
contemporary examples were added in place of ancient ones and some attempt is made 
to transfer Aristotle’s theories from the Greek polis to the medieval kingdom. The 
struggle to accommodate Aristotle’s often foreign concepts to the medieval worldview 
was evident in many places, such as when Thomas Aquinas defines “polity” as “when 
the ruler rules according to scientific rules (i.e., according to laws established by 
political science).”131 It appears Aquinas is trying to both explain an unfamiliar political 
term and make Aristotle’s political theory more amenable to a medieval audience; a 
singule ruler (a king) could still count amoung Aristotle’s best practical regimes in this 
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schema, as long as he is restrained by the law. Later in the same text, however, Aquinas 
states, “And we call the regime in which the multitude rules and strives for the common 
benefit a polity, which is the common name for all regimes.” 132 Thomas Aquinas may 
have himself been struggling to determine exactly how to deal with Aristotle and his 
terminology. 
As one can see, these works are more than just summaries of Aristotle’s (poorly 
translated) text. Thinkers drew attention to the questions they felt were most pressing. In 
both Albert and Thomas Aquinas, significant space is dedicated to the subject of law and 
the place of law within political science. They discuss such subjects as “Can there be a 
bad law?” and “What areas can be regulated by law? Should child-rearing be off-
limits?”133 The authors concern with legal issues shines through, even when they are 
providing a chapter-by-chapter to Aristotle’s text (which, in comparison, devotes less 
space to legal questions). As long as western political thinkers have been trying to 
understand Aristotle, they have also been trying to use him to address their own 
questions. 
 As a basic understanding of Aristotle’s political premises became more readily 
available, these earliest commentaries were followed by works, such as Peter of 
Auvergne’s Questions, that moved beyond explication of Aristotle and began to use 
discussions of the Politics as a platform for advancing one’s own political views. For 
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example, Peter’s Questions offers a consistent defense of monarchy as the best form of 
government, rejecting the inclusion of mixed intuitions, such as elections, as being good 
in theory but not viable in practice. 134 Here Aristotle’s text brings up the subject of the 
best constitution, but Peter is then willing to move away from simply explaining 
Aristotle’s answer and provides his own ideas instead. Thinkers needed to gain a basic 
grasp of Aristotle’s political thought before they could apply his ideas or methodology 
themselves. Thus, there is a gradual process whereby thinkers tried to understand 
Aristotle and then begin to use his texts for their own purposes. 
 
DO THE EARLY COMMENTATORS COUNT AS ARISTOTELIANS? 
 These earliest discussions of Aristotle’s political and moral thought are certainly 
deeply concerned with Aristotle and indebted to his writings; yet, in most cases, they do 
not meet my criteria for medieval Aristotelian political science. The main reason is fairly 
simple: they’re not conducting science, they’re simply trying to understand what 
Aristotle is saying. However, I do not intend this as a criticism of the commentators. A 
commentary has a fundamentally different aim from a work of political science. These 
authors were trying to explain the Aristotelian project and what Aristotle’s conclusions 
were, as well as why such a project was an acceptable part of Christian learning. In these 
matters, the early commentators were to a large extent successful.  
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 In order to be a part of a mature scientific community, one has to be socialized 
within its framework so that the assumptions of the paradigm are taken for granted. One 
can then continue in one’s work, knowing that the scholarly audience will already accept 
your basic premises as true. They were socialized in the same paradigm. The earliest 
writers on Aristotelian political thought in the west could take none of these things for 
granted. Aristotle was still  somewhat unfamiliar terrain, and many of his premises were 
quite controversial. Early commentators, such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, 
could not even assume their audience understood the available Latin texts (in most cases 
it was probably safer to assume they didn’t). They then had to make a case for why 
politics should be viewed through this Aristotelian framework rather than, for example, 
an Augustinian or neo-Platonic perspective. A scientist in a mature discipline has none 
of these concerns; he or she can simply begin working on a proscribed puzzle without 
defending each individual assumption on which their conclusion is based. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter examined some of the thinkers writing just before and just after the 
dissemination of the Latin translation of Aristotle’s Politics. In many ways, they are 
similar to later medieval Aristotelians. They use Aristotelian political language and 
exempla. They argue for the naturalness of the political community and they recognize 
the different forms of constitutions as significant to the study of politics. Yet none of 
these thinkers is entirely immersed in the Aristotelian paradigm or engaged in 
Aristotelian political science. They are undertaking a project of a fundamentally 
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different nature. Brunetto Latini was compiling an encyclopedia of human knowledge. 
While it is clear that Aristotle helped shaped the content of the political and ethical 
sections of this work, these were only a small portion of his project. And although Latini 
does offer his opinion that a republic is the best type of constitution, he does not of the 
systematic defense of this position that is seen in later Aristotelian thinkers, such as 
Ptolemy of Lucca. Likewise, the commentators are not Aristotelian political scientists. 
They discuss regime types in the context of explaining Aristotle’s classification system, 
but do not provide their readers with substantial discussions of their views on the matter. 
By the time Peter of Auvergne wrote his Questions on the Politics, however, this is 
starting to change. As thinkers became more comfortable with Aristotle and his political 
framework, they were increasingly able to utilize his model of political science but come 
to their own conclusions.  
 The thinkers writing before the maturation of the Aristotelian paradigm do not 
“fail” at Aristotelian political science; they are simply engaged in other projects. 
Brunetto Latini is more concerned with providing an overview of the most current 
knowledge in all subjects than offering an in depth defense of his political views. Early 
commentators are trying to make Aristotle’s text understandable and acceptable to a 
medieval Christian audience. In my view, both are fairly successful at achieving their 
aims. In particular, the work of commentators in the later thirteenth century laid the 
groundwork for the Aristotelian political science of the fourteenth century. Only after a 
thinker like Thomas Aquinas had fought for the acceptability of the study of Aristotle 
and worked to make the Philosopher’s words intelligible to medieval minds could a 
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political thinker like Ptolemy of Lucca come along and use the methodology of the 
Politics to engage in his own scientific study of the political community. 
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CHAPTER V 
PTOLEMY OF LUCCA: 
ROMAN REPUBLICANISM IN AN ARISTOTELIAN FRAMEWORK 
 
 By the start of the fourteenth century, the Aristotelian paradigm had come to 
dominate the study of politics in the West. Aristotelian language was integrated into 
political discourse. Both the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics were standard texts in 
medieval universities. Medieval political thinkers were applying Aristotelian 
methodology and asking what sort of regime is best. This chapter explores one of these 
Aristotelian political scientists, Ptolemy of Lucca. Ptolemy worked within the mature 
Aristotelian paradigm, but his political influences were not limited to Aristotle.  
Ptolemy’s treatise, De regimine principum, defends a republican government with strong 
Roman and Christian influences. By examining Ptolemy’s work, this chapter will 
illustrate how medieval political thinkers could use Aristotle’s methodology while still 
drawing most of their inspiration from distinctly non-Aristotelian sources.  
 
PTOLEMY OF LUCCA 
 With the publication of James Blythe’s two volume study of Ptolemy, much 
more information has become available on the life and thought of this remarkable 
medieval thinker. Unfortunately, several areas are still somewhat cloudy. Ptolemy of 
Lucca (or Tolomeo Fiadoni) was born sometime around 1236 in the northern Italian city 
of Lucca, most likely into a family of fairly well off merchants. Lucca, lying on a major 
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roadway between France and Rome, was quite cosmopolitan by medieval standards, 
serving as a center of trade and manufacturing, particularly for the silk industry. Its 
communal government placed an exceptionally large portion of political power in the 
hands of the popolo, a trend that would only increase during Ptolemy’s lifetime.135 
  Little is known about Ptolemy’s early life and education in Lucca. The earliest 
recorded event in Ptolemy’s biography is his traveling from Rome to Naples with 
Thomas Aquinas, though it is likely these two figures knew each other well before this 
date. Despite assumptions by many scholars (myself included), it is now considered 
uncertain as to whether Ptolemy ever studied formally with Aquinas at the University of 
Paris. Ptolemy travelled throughout Italy and France with Aquinas and later on his own. 
In 1300 or 1301, Ptolemy was elected prior of Santa Maria Novella, the famous 
Dominican house in Florence; by 1307 he appears to have moved to San Remano. A few 
years later, he relocated, with the papal curia, to Avignon. Around 1318, he was 
appointed bishop of Torcello, where he remained until his death, despite rumors of 
senility (it is likely Ptolemy was in his eighties when he took the position).136 
 Ptolemy’s most well known political work, and the one on which this chapter 
will focus, is the continuation of a treatise known as De regimine principum. Originally, 
the entire text was attributed to Thomas Aquinas; however, in the twentieth century, 
scholars established that this text had at least two authors and Ptolemy of Lucca was 
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responsible for the section from Book II.4.7 onward.137 As the two sections of the text 
differ completely in both style and content, it seems amazing that the entire work was 
attributed to a single author for so long. Some debate exists as to whether Aquinas 
actually wrote the entire first section, but that is not of major consequence for this 
chapter.138 Ptolemy’s portion of De regimine principum outlines a defense of republican 
government, and particularly of republican Rome, that calls on both Christian and 
Aristotelian sources for support. Despite his avid support for republicanism in the 
secular realm, Ptolemy remained a passionate supporter of papal monarchy and of papal 
involvement in political affairs.139 This did not strike Ptolemy as a contradiction.  
  
MODERN SCHOLARSHIP ON PTOLEMY 
 Ptolemy of Lucca has drawn attention from modern scholars for his praise of 
republican government and apparent espousal of humanist values in the Middle Ages. 
Scholars such as Charles Till Davis have remarked on Ptolemy’s admiration for classical 
sources (both Greek and Latin). Davis argues that, drawing on these classical 
inspirations, Ptolemy placed a remarkable ( for the Middle Ages) amount on value on 
politics and its role in the good life.140 Recent work by John La Salle and James Blythe 
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suggests that even Hans Baron recognized humanist elements in the writings of this early 
fourteenth century thinker.141 From the latter part of the twentieth century onward, 
scholars have shown an increasing interest in and appreciation for Ptolemy and other 
medieval republicans as political thinkers in their own right, not simply as precursors to 
the fully formed humanism and republicanism of the Renaissance. As John Hine Mundy 
has pointed out, republican thought can be seen in Italy as early as the thirteenth century, 
and by the fourteenth century, Ptolemy of Lucca is offering practical arguments for the 
accountability of public officials and public involvement in governing.142 These are not 
modern concepts.  
 Several of the scholars mentioned above have remarked that Ptolemy’s work was 
deeply influenced by his reading of Aristotle. They note that unlike neo-Platonic 
Christian thinkers, such as Augustine of Hippo, Ptolemy does not see political life as 
connected to sin, but rather as part of our nature.143 Not only is politics not a sign of 
human depravity, it can actually be an avenue for the exercise of virtue for Ptolemy 
explicitly connects to the higher end of spiritual fulfillment. As James Blythe as has 
pointed out, “Civic virtue is not different from religious virtue, still less opposed to it, 
but of the same nature, and though inferior to it, a necessary prerequisite.”144 These 
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authors are correct in noting the value that Ptolemy places on political life. Like 
Aristotle, he sees government as having the potential to play a positive role in people’s 
lives and even to inculcate virtue (a topic that will be discussed at greater length later in 
this chapter).  However, at times Blythe goes too far in asserting Aristotle’s influence. 
Blythe attributes Ptolemy’s preference for “political” government to Aristotle’s espousal 
of polity or a mixed regime as the best practical constitution in the politics. According to 
Blythe, this leads Ptolemy (and a number of other later medieval thinkers) to adopt this 
as their preferred constitution as well.145 As Cary Nederman and I have argued, however, 
in the sections of De regimine principum where Ptolemy advocates political rule, he 
draws on Roman Republican sources far more than on Aristotle. Furthermore, his 
defense of republicanism relies on the necessity of including all elements of the citizen 
body and the importance of civic virtue in building character, not the need for balancing 
the competing interests of the rich and poor, as Aristotle’s defense of polity does.146 
 Blythe recently composed the first book-length discussion of Ptolemy’s thought 
in  English. Here, he does his best to do justice the complexities and apparent 
contradictions in Ptolemy’s text. The first volume of this work is dedicated to Ptolemy’s 
life and historical context, including the composition of his major works. The second 
volume covers Ptolemy’s thought with a heavy (though not exclusive) emphasis on his 
political ideas. Blythe maintains that Ptolemy is a republican theorist, albeit one who is 
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also greatly concerned with when different forms of regimes are necessary. Blythe also 
tries to place Ptolemy’s political work in the context of his wider (largely religious) 
worldview; Ptolemy sees no contradiction in supporting popular participation in secular 
politics while maintaining the authoritative superiority and political prerogatives of the 
pope. Not does he shy away from arguing for both the natural foundations of the 
political community and its ability, through the development of political virtue, to aid in 
the spiritual advancement of mankind. Blythe finishes his work by defending Ptolemy 
from the oft-leveled charge of being a bit player in the development of western thought. 
Blythe contends that Ptolemy’s republican theory influenced the work of important 
thinkers like Savonarola and had a profound impact on the republican tradition as we 
know it.147 
 Recently, Bee Yun has challenged the notion that Ptolemy of Lucca should be 
read as a republican at all. Yun contends that Ptolemy’s association of monarchy with 
tyranny should not be taken as a condemnation of monarchy per se, but rather an attack 
on the French king who was at the time in dispute with the papacy.148 Yun goes as far as 
to say, “Ptolemy’s sympathy for republican rule hardly went beyond an emotional 
dimension, bearing almost no theoretical or practical fruits worthy of the title of 
republicanism.”149 Yun also argues that previous scholars have conflated Ptolemy’s 
views on secular and spiritual rule; Ptolemy was an adamant defender of papal 
                                                 
147
 Blythe, The Life and Works of Tolomeo Fiadoni (Ptolemy of Lucca), and The 
Worldview and Thought of Tolomeo Fiadoni (Ptolemy of Lucca) (Turnhout: Brepols, 
2009), pp. 208-37. 
148
 Bee Yun, “Ptolemy of Lucca- A Pioneer of Civic Republicanism? A Reassessment,” 
History of Political Thought  XXIX (2008): 417-39, esp. pp. 43-34. 
149
 Yun, “Ptolemy of Lucca- A Pioneer of Civic Republicanism?,” p. 435. 
 87 
monarchy. Yun’s claims would, perhaps, have some justification if the republican 
reading of De regimine principum were based entirely on Ptolemy’s critical comments 
about monarchy. Unfortunately, Yun pays scant attention to Ptolemy’s discussions of 
citizenship and the necessity of including members of all different strata in the city’s 
public decision-making. In terms of recognizing the distinction between Ptolemy’s 
political and religious thought, Charles Davis’s “Roman Patriotism and Republican 
Propaganda” more accurately describes Ptolemy’s ability to endorse a popular 
republican government in the secular realm while still fiercely defending the unilateral 
rights of the pope on religious matters.150 Ptolemy’s acknowledgement of the pope’s 
autocratic power within the Catholic Church need not imply an endorsement of secular 
monarchy. 
 Despite a long history of relative neglect from scholars, Ptolemy of Lucca is 
gaining increasing recognition as an important figure in the development of republican 
thought and the civic humanist impulse that led to the Renaissance (although his position 
as a republican is not entirely undisputed). Ptolemy was a thinker who drew on many 
different intellectual traditions, and scholars are still debating which were the most 
influential in different areas of his thought. Despite their differences, more scholars do 
seem to be agreeing that Ptolemy is, if nothing else, worthy of their attention. 
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PTOLEMY’S ARGUMENTS FOR HIS BEST REGIME 
In the text of De regimine principum, Ptolemy explores different types of 
regimes and argues for the superiority of political or republican rule. Throughout this 
work, Ptolemy frequently cites Aristotle’s texts, even though he often strays quite far 
from Aristotelian political principles. Ptolemy’s application of Aristotelian language (as 
well as the other political languages prominent in the later Middle Ages) is particularly 
skillful. References to Aristotle and his work are fairly frequent in De regimine 
principum; at times, the Politics is simply used as a helpful sourcebook to illustrate the 
characteristics of the different political regimes of ancient Greece; in other cases, 
Aristotle’s words are carefully manipulated to support Ptolemy’s position on the 
superiority of ancient Rome and the republican institutions found therein. One instance 
of Ptolemy’s clever utilization of Aristotelian texts is evident in Book II, where he draws 
on Aristotle’s classification of the different types of constitutions; instead of using the 
standard divisions in Books 3.6-4.10, Ptolemy favors employing only two categories: 
“Although in Book 5 of the Politics Aristotle supposes that there are many forms of rule, 
which I have already described and will discuss again, elsewhere in the same work he 
supposes that there are only two, political and despotic, each of which has its own 
distinctive ministers.”151 What is Ptolemy is referring to here is the distinction between 
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the different types of rule within the household illustrated in Book 1 of the Politics. 
However, Aristotle made it clear that the city could not be treated as an extended 
household; Ptolemy thus deliberately defies a central tenet of Aristotelian political 
philosophy.152 As one can see, Ptolemy of Lucca has read Aristotle’s text very 
strategically.  
Nor is Ptolemy simply an inattentive reader of Aristotle. Later in Book II, 
Ptolemy makes it clear to his reader that he is conscious of the fact that his position 
directly conflicts with that of the Politics when he defends his decision to collapse 
monarchy and tyranny into a single category: “But then one may object that Aristotle 
contrasts regal and despotic rule in Book I of the Politics. I will explain this in the next 
book…but for now it will suffice to prove what I have said using divine Scripture.”153 
He never does go back to explain why this proposition does not contradict Aristotle. 
From this passage, one can see that Ptolemy was aware of the discrepancies between his 
thought and that of Aristotle and deliberately chose to obscure these differences.154 
There are many instances of Ptolemy simply using Aristotle’s text as a 
convenient historical sourcebook. For example, in Book 2 Chapter 3 of De regimine 
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principum, he concurs with Aristotle’s assessment of Lycurgus’s decision to ban 
currency in his realm; it was pure foolishness. 155 Here, there is clearly no need to 
manipulate the words of Aristotle. Similarly, the text of the Politics could provide 
Ptolemy with information about other great thinkers of ancient Greece.  For example, in 
Book 4, he questions Plato’s/Socrates’s claim that some women should be permitted to 
take up arms and fight in wars; however, since he was not able to refer directly to the 
text of the Republic, Ptolemy instead cites Aristotle’s discussion of Plato’s position in 
the Politics.156  
As the above passages show, Ptolemy works hard to maintain a surface 
adherence to Aristotle’s philosophy, even when his own views diverge from those of the 
ancient philosopher. Despite his reverence for Aristotle’s authority, Ptolemy’s own 
political views come across loud and clear. Throughout De regimine princpium Ptolemy 
advocates republican or “political” rule as the superior type of government. This type of 
government he specifically identified with his native Italy: “Political rule exists when a 
region, province, city, or town is governed by one or many according to its own statutes, 
as happens in regions of Italy and especially in Rome, which for the most part has been 
governed by Senators and consuls ever since the city was founded.”157 Although not 
ideal for every state at all times, Ptolemy comes to the conclusion that political rule is 
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superior to regal rule, especially when the populace in question is virtuous and freedom-
loving: 
Political government is placed ahead of royal government for two reasons. 
First, if we refer lordship to the integral state of human nature, called the 
State of Innocence, in which there was political, not regal, lordship, there 
was not lordship that involved servitude, but rather preeminence and 
subjection existed according to the merits of each… Therefore, political 
government was better for wise and virtuous persons, such as the ancient 
Romans, since it imitated this state of nature… The second reason political 
government is placed ahead of royal government has to do with how the land 
is situated with respect to the stars. This disposes the region in various ways, 
as I said above, so we see that certain provinces are suited to servitude and 
other to liberty.158 
Republican government is praised here as the type of government closest to what would 
have been found in the Garden of Eden. Although drawing heavily on both Roman and 
Christian elements to craft this pro-republican argument, Ptolemy maintains an 
adherence to the Aristotelian proposition that politics is natural and not the result of sin. 
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 Book III of De regimine principum defends the rule of the Roman Republic. 
Here, Ptolemy first contends that the Romans could not have ruled so successfully 
without the assistance of the Divine Will. He then outlines why God rewarded the 
Romans for their civic virtue by making them the rulers of the known world. Finally, 
Ptolemy explains that the Roman Republic actually helped paved the way for the coming 
of Christ; Republican government requires virtue and self-sacrifice on the part of its 
citizens. The Romans, through their praising of civic virtue and love of justice, offered a 
precursor to the reign of Christ.159 Setting up the Romans as both virtuous political rulers 
and harbingers of Christ paves the way for Ptolemy’s discussion in Book IV of what the 
ideal regime would look like.  
 In Book IV, Ptolemy describes an ideal Christian republic, one that politically 
resembles the Roman Republic to a very great extent. Although Ptolemy is concerned 
with human flourishing, he does not ignore the importance of material needs in the 
formation of the political community. Compared to other natural creatures, human 
beings are weak and vulnerable; without the mutual aid provided by living in society, we 
could not survive as a species.160 The value of the city, as Ptolemy describes it, comes 
from its ability to meet the material needs of citizens through the practice of the arts and 
crafts: “To the extent that a city is greater than a town or village, there will be more arts 
and artisans present there to assure the sufficiency of human life, and it is from these that 
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the city is constituted.”161 Ptolemy repeatedly emphasizes the unity of the political 
community. While there are many different parts and ranks among the citizens, all are 
brought together and share in communal and political life.162 
 In contrast to Aristotle, Ptolemy’s Christian republicanism contains a remarkably 
inclusive notion of citizenship. Having established the importance of artisans in creating 
a city in human beings can thrive, Ptolemy argues that they should therefore be counted 
as full members of the community, a notably un-Aristotelian position. This inclusivity 
means that Ptolemy’s ideal republic has a strong populist element: 
It seems to be consonant with reason that they [rulers] were elevated to the 
government of the people with the consent of all counsel, as today is 
common in Italian cities. The name ‘city’ implies this, which, according to 
Augustine, is ‘a multitude of human beings bound together by some chain of 
society,’ so that a city is, as it were, a unity of citizens. Therefore, since the 
name ‘city’ includes all citizens, it indeed seems reasonable that it ought to 
search for its government from the separate kinds of citizens, since the 
merits of individuals are necessary for the state of civil government.163 
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Ptolemy argues that as all members of the city (including artisans) are necessary for its 
functioning, they should all be included as citizens. This passage also implies that 
citizens from all classes should at least have the opportunity for political participation. 
 Throughout De regimine principum, Ptolemy blends various political traditions, 
most prominently, Aristotelian, Roman, and Christian. He is comfortable moving 
between these different language systems in constructing his argument for Christian 
republicanism. While his methodology is Aristotelian, the substance of his arguments, 
e.g., that artisans should have citizenship rights, and that political virtue can prepare one 
for salvation in the afterlife, is frequently quite un-Aristotelian. However, this does not 
lead to a confused political theory; Ptolemy is a very skillful political thinker who is 
adept at borrowing from different political traditions in order to craft a unique argument 
for republican government that would appeal to his medieval audience.  
 
PTOLEMY AS AN ARISTOTELIAN POLITICAL SCIENTIST 
 As this chapter shows, Ptolemy of Lucca drew from a diverse array of sources in 
crafting his political arguments. His relationship with Aristotle’s text is complex. On 
some topics, Aristotle does seem to have inspired Ptolemy’s political thinking. For 
example, De regimine principum advocates a positive role for government in the lives of 
its citizens and even contends that politics can help bring about a more virtuous life. He 
sees politics as a natural aspect of the human life and not the product of sinfulness, as the 
Augustinian tradition contends. In other important ways, Ptolemy departs from the 
Aristotelian tradition. Rather than using the six-fold classification of regimes from the 
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politics, Ptolemy deliberately breaks with Aristotle in arguing that there are really only 
two different types of regimes, regal and political. Later in his text, Ptolemy argues for 
the inclusion of all members of the city (even laborers) in the ranks of citizens. This is 
not done as a necessary evil to preserve stability in the city (as Aristotle might suggest) 
but because for Ptolemy, every member of the community is necessary for its flourishing 
and has the potential to contribute to its economic and political well-being. Ptolemy’s 
attitude toward working-class members of the city is remarkably different from that of 
the more elitist Aristotle. 
 Although Ptolemy borrows from Aristotle in some places, this does not limit his 
arguments. Ptolemy is a flexible thinker who can move between the political traditions 
of the late Middle Ages and even misrepresent his sources where needed. When 
Aristotle doesn’t support his collapsing of kingship and tyranny into a single type of 
constitution, he turns to Biblical discussions of kingship instead.164 His arguments for 
republican government are supported with numerous Roman historical sources, and 
Augustine is even misquoted to appear approving of Rome.165 This strategic use of 
source material allows Ptolemy of Lucca to create a lengthy list of supporting authorities 
without being substantially limited in what he can argue. 
 Ptolemy’s numerous disagreements with Aristotle do not prevent him from being 
a prime example of an Aristotelian political scientist. Ptolemy of Lucca is fully 
immersed in the Aristotelian paradigm. Ptolemy was thus fully familiar with Christian 
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Aristotelianism and its assumptions. He uses much of Aristotle’s moral and political 
language and frequently cites the Philosopher throughout his text, drawing not just on 
the Politics, but on the Ethics and Metaphysics as well. Even where Ptolemy disagrees 
with Aristotle, he does his best to hide this fact by selectively (and often disingenuously) 
citing Aristotle’s text. Most importantly, Ptolemy follows an Aristotelian political 
methodology. De regimine principum is dedicated to discovering and defending the best 
type of constitution. Ptolemy considers the different types of regimes and comes up with 
his own schema for their classification. Even though his conclusions here directly 
conflict with those of Aristotle, he still tries to tie his project to that of the Politics by 
citing Aristotle’s discussion of rule within the household.166 The remainder of De 
regimine principum is spent explaining why political rule is superior to regal, why the 
Roman Republic the best example of the former, and what the modern-day ideal 
government would look like. Like Aristotle, Ptolemy begins with the collection of 
empirical data from both historical sources and contemporary city-states on different 
regime types and their effects on citizens’ lives. He then uses this data to answer the 
normative question of what constitution is best. Ptolemy’s methodology is Aristotelian at 
heart. 
 The effect of Aristotelian political methodology can be seen even more clearly 
when one compares the work of Ptolemy of Lucca with that of Brunetto Latini 
(discussed in Chapter IV). In terms of the political content of their work, these authors 
are remarkably similar. This should perhaps not be surprising as both are products of the 
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communes of northern Italy, where they would have been amply familiar with 
republican government. Both men advocate popular republics where laborers and 
artisans would have the opportunity to participate in politics. Both are for an inclusive 
notion of citizenship based on the important role artisans play in the economic life of 
cities. Yet, Les Livres dou Tresor and De regimine principum are very different works. 
Brunetto touches on the subject of the best regime as part of a wide-ranging discussion 
of moral philosophy and human history. Ptolemy, on the other hand, presents his reader 
with a more thorough treatise on politics, one specifically focused on regimes; 
promoting republican government is the focus of his text. Additionally, although 
Brunetto offers up his opinion on what type of constitution is best, he spends very little 
time explaining why before moving on to other subjects. De regimine principum 
provides a much more elaborate defense of republican government that considers the 
benefits of a wider citizen body and even under what situations other forms of 
government might be preferable. Like Aristotle, Ptolemy freely acknowledged that the 
ideal regime might not be possible in all circumstances. Ptolemy of Lucca explores the 
same political structures as earlier republicans, but within the framework of Aristotelian 
political science. 
 
CONCLUSION: PTOLEMY OF LUCCA AND NORMAL SCIENCE 
 In the conclusion of his two volume study of Ptolemy of Lucca’s life and 
thought, James Blythe addresses criticisms made of Ptolemy upon the release of the 
English translation of De regimine principum over a decade ago. At the time, John Watt 
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dismissed Ptolemy as a minor figure whose work was too unimaginative to warrant 
attention from scholars outside of specialists in the Middle Ages. Ptolemy of Lucca is no 
Thomas Aquinas. Blythe, however, comes to Ptolemy’s defense: 
But Watt’s attitude… suggests a misguided prejudice often-found in 
discussions of the medieval contributions to intellectual history: that it 
suffices to touch on one or two ‘greats,’ usually Thomas Aquinas for 
anything and Marsilius of Padua for political thought, before moving on to 
the Renaissance… and modern period, leaving the study of lesser figures to 
specialists of the period. ‘It is unlikely,’ Watt adds, ‘that “it could benefit all 
historians of political thought” or that they should feel obliged to read it.’ I 
argue that in several ways Tolomeo is more significant for the history of 
political thought than Thomas Aquinas and other major figures…There are 
[certain of Ptolemy’s beliefs], such as the emergence of civic humanism, 
hatred of monarchy, and love of freedom and republicanism, that are 
essential [to the history of political thought]. This assertion is not solely a 
contextual one. Tolomeo does provide a more transparent window into the 
thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Italian republican milieu than 
Thomas or Marsilius, but- although this is difficult to demonstrate 
conclusively- he also, in my opinion, played more of a direct part than they 
in the evolution of modern republicanism.167 
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My thesis supports Blythe’s contention, although in different terms. Ptolemy of Lucca 
was a normal scientist. He did not create the Aristotelian political paradigm, but he 
worked within the paradigm to answer its puzzles. As Thomas Kuhn noted in Structures 
of Scientific Revolutions, while “revolutionary” scientists who introduce new paradigms 
to their fields are typically later heralded as the “great thinkers” of their age, the names 
of normal scientists are often lost to history. Nevertheless, they make critical 
contributions to the development of a science.168 Ptolemy took the assumptions and 
methodology of Aristotelianism and applied them to the pressing political questions of 
his time and place: Why is political rule a better type of government? What would an 
ideal Christian republic look like? And under what conditions is this ideal government 
appropriate?  
 Ptolemy of Lucca provides an excellent example of the mature Aristotelian 
political scientist. He utilizes Aristotelian methodology, while drawing on numerous 
political traditions for his inspiration. He addresses in practical and realistic terms the 
question of what regime is best. Aristotle gives Ptolemy a framework for his political 
investigation, but Ptolemy comes up with his own answers. Ptolemy serves as a 
representative of normal science in the Aristotelian paradigm. He didn’t invent the 
paradigm; he solved puzzles within it. Yet, his work was critical in developing notions 
of republicanism that continue to shape western political theory to this day.  
 
                                                 
168
 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 23-42. 
 100 
CHAPTER VI 
DANTE’S ARISTOTELIAN IMPERIALISM 
 
 In the previous chapter of this dissertation, I demonstrated how Ptolemy of Lucca 
utilized the Aristotelian political framework to defend republican government and the 
virtues of political participation. Yet the use of Aristotelian political methodology does 
not guarantee this outcome. Thinkers working within the medieval Aristotelian paradigm 
offered a wide variety of solutions to the Aristotelian problem of discovering the best 
constitution. The chapter will look at another thinker working within the mature 
Aristotelian paradigm, Dante Alighieri, and how he approached the study of politics. 
Like Ptolemy of Lucca, he focuses his political work on defending his preferred 
constitution, and he shares many assumptions with Aristotle and his medieval followers. 
Yet in his final conclusion about what time of government is best, Dante is very far from 
Ptolemy or Aristotle, advocating a universal unchecked monarchy. 
This chapter examines Dante’s political treatise, De monarchia, which argues for 
the establishment of an all-powerful world monarchy, the secular counterweight to the 
papacy. Drawing on Aristotelian metaphysics, Christian theology, and his own 
Ghibelline political beliefs, Dante argues that the only way to ensure peace and justice in 
the world is to give all authority and materials possessions to single individual. 
Throughout this work, Dante makes abundant use of Aristotelian quotations and 
syllogistic logic. Many of his assumptions about the universe and about human nature 
are derived from his reading of Aristotle’s texts. Most importantly, he follows Aristotle’s 
political methodology in his investigation of the best government. Thus, I argue, that 
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even while advocating a political position at odds with Aristotle’s Politics, Dante 
Alighieri should be considered a medieval Aristotelian. 
 
DANTE’S LIFE AND EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND 
 Dante Alighieri was born in Florence in 1260 into an aristocratic, though not 
terribly wealthy, family. Although best known in the modern era for his poetic writings, 
in his lifetime Dante was highly involved in Florentine politics as a member of the 
Guelph party. However, after the split between the Black and White factions of the 
party, Dante was exiled from his native city in 1301 and would never return. Jilted by 
the Guelphs, Dante abandoned his old allegiances and became an ardent advocate for the 
Holy Roman Emperor’s claims in Italy. During his time in exile, Dante consoled himself 
with writing, composing works of both poetry and prose. Along with the well known 
Divine Comedy (whose political implications have been well documented by scholars), 
Dante also wrote a philosophical treatise, the Convivio, modeled after Boethius’s 
Consolation of Philosophy, and a political tract titled De monarchia. All of these works 
reflect Dante’s reformed political position and advocate the establishment of a universal 
secular imperial power. 
 Dante’s education has been the subject of much speculation. By the late 
thirteenth century, the seeds of pre-humanism were apparent in Florence, and many 
classical texts would have been available for study. In the Inferno, Dante refers to 
Brunetto Latini as his master or teacher, and this is likely the case. Latini (treated in 
Chapter IV) was well versed on classical authors, including Cicero, Boethius, Sallust, 
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and parts of the Aristotelian corpus. Latini was an admirer of the ancients and an avid 
proponent of republican virtue. At some point during his education, it is also probable 
that Dante studied with Remigio de Girolami, Florence’s premier philosopher, who had 
studied at Paris during Aquinas’s years there. Remigio is the most likely source for much 
of Dante’s Aristotelianism. In Remigio’s own work, he makes frequent citations of 
Aristotle’s major works, including the Ethics, the Politics, Physics, and De Anima.169 
 Although Dante includes frequent citations from Aristotle in his own writings, 
there is still considerable uncertainty about which of his works Dante had read in toto. 
Highly specific references to the Nicomachean Ethics and the Metaphysics in both De 
monarchia and Convivio lead scholars to believe that Dante had direct access to these 
texts at the time he was writing. The Politics, on the other hand, though cited regularly in 
both works, never includes a reference to a specific book number. This has led scholars 
to suggest that either Dante had read the Politics earlier but did not have the text at hand 
at the time he was composing his own political works, or Dante’s knowledge of the 
Politics was derived from the considerable secondary sources available to him at the 
time. This would include Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum, and numerous works 
by Thomas Aquinas.170 Whether Dante was able to read the complete translation of the 
Politics or not, it is clear that he was familiar with most of its main premises. Between 
reading other works of Aristotle, contemporary authors who relied heavily on Aristotle, 
                                                 
169
 Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, “Dante’s Reading of Aristotle,” ed. Cecil Grayson, The 
World of Dante: Essays on Dante and his Times (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 
61-79, esp. pp. 69-72; Charles T. Davis, “Education in Dante’s Florence,” Speculum 40 
(1965): 415-35. 
170
 Allan H. Gilbert, “Had Dante Read the Politics of Aristotle?,” PMLA 43 (1928): 602-
13. 
 103 
and studying with Remigio de Girolami, Dante’s education contained a healthy dose of 
Aristotelianism.  
 
SCHOLARSHIP ON DANTE 
 In contrast to thinkers like Brunetto Latini and Ptolemy of Lucca, Dante’s 
contributions to the history of political thought have, if anything, been over-studied. 
Numerous articles and monographs have explored both his more explicitly philosophical 
tracts (De monarchia and Convivio) as well as the political implications of the Divine 
Comedy. This chapter will focus primarily on the former two treatises and their 
accompanying scholarship, not because the Divine Comedy lacks political content or is 
unworthy of study as a piece of political thought, but because it is in Convivio and De 
monarchia that the influence of the Aristotelian paradigm can be seen most clearly. Even 
excluding the scholarship focused on the Divine Comedy, however, there is still plenty of 
material to explore and many conflicting opinions about Dante and his political ideas. 
 One of the continuing debates in Dante scholarship is about the extent to which 
Dante resembles earlier medieval thinkers and to what extent he is more like the later 
Italian humanists. How modern is Dante? Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves concludes that 
Dante is, in fact, quite medieval in his political outlook. Passerin d’Entrèves points out 
that, for Dante, the ultimate purpose of temporal government is to maintain peace and 
prevent outbreaks of violence and greed; this constitutes a negative, almost Augustinian 
view of the purpose of politics. Passerin d’Entrèves considers this worldview to be 
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wholly medieval.171 On the other side, Marvin Becker argues that, in keeping with other 
political thinkers of his day, such as Ptolemy of Lucca, Dante had a very positive view 
of earthly government and its role in the salvation of mankind, almost to the point of 
heterodoxy: “Dante himself pushes the schoolman’s theories until they serve to justify 
the positive value of earthly government. Indeed, he comes perilously close to proposing 
the quintessential beatitude of this life as independent from celestial beatitude. Again he 
and his contemporaries legitimize, almost sanctify, the political impulse of the 
citizenry.”172 There is a remarkable amount of truth in both these arguments, and one is 
often left agreeing with Becker’s opening statement, that Dante occupies a “middle 
ground” in western political thought.173 
 The ability of government to play a positive role in people’s lives is not the only 
area in which scholars clash over the extent to which Dante is really “medieval.” Derek 
Davis asserts that Dante’s insistence that political and spiritual power be organized in 
distinct and separate institutions make him a remarkably modern thinker, more in line 
with the Renaissance than the Middle Ages. According to Davis, the notion of separation 
of church and state, ultimately culminating in the United States Constitution, can be 
traced back to Dante’s work.174 However, as Barbara Barclay Carter has noted, Dante’s 
distinct authorities are still expected to work in harmony:  
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But while the spiritual and temporal planes remain distinct, they are 
interdependent. It is the task of the secular authority to guide men to earthly 
happiness in accordance with the moral and intellectual virtues, through the 
exercise of reason, while it is for the spiritual authority to guide them to 
eternal happiness, through teachings transcending reason and the theological 
virtues.175 
It does seem that Davis is perhaps exaggerating the novelty of Dante’s a distinction 
between secular and religious authority; the “two suns” of Dante’s political theory have 
overlapping duties and are still a far cry from modern notions of a wall of separation 
between church and state. Furthermore, his thought was not significantly more extreme 
in this area than several other medieval thinkers, including John of Paris and Marsiglio 
of Padua.  
 One of the more interesting uses of Dante by political theorists has been the 
application of his thought to modern notions of cosmopolitanism and international order. 
De monarchia, in particular, is read as a blueprint for a system of international law; in 
these cases, it is generally Dante’s emphasis on the importance of world peace and a 
world-wide standard for justice that are emphasized, rather than the specific proposals of 
his government. As Kenneth Sills has argued: “To Dante’s mind it was impossible that 
two quarreling nations should submit their differences to another nation for decision, and 
that nations should agree to abide by the decrees of an international court. But he saw 
very clearly that is justice was to flourish among nations as among individuals, there 
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must be some final means of settling disputes.”176 Although advocating an overarching 
world order, Dante is still read as respecting the political and cultural traditions of 
individual nations. In this way, Dante is taken as a precursor of modern international law 
theory and an advocate for supranational institutions (although, in many cases scholars 
simply drop his name in order to show that theories of international organization have a 
longer pedigree than most would expect).177 
 Despite its age, Etienne Gilson’s study, Dante the Philosopher, still provides one 
of the most thoughtful examinations of Dante’s political and social philosophy. Gilson 
takes the time to explore each of Dante’s major works and note the potential for 
contradiction between them. He is also one of the only Dante scholars to find anything 
odd with Dante’s plan for achieving world peace and eliminating greed (giving all power 
and material goods to one person).178 Gilson also offers a very nuanced view on the 
impact of Aristotle on Dante’s political theory. Gilson argues that Aristotle, and his 
Nicomachean Ethics in particular, definitely helped shaped Dante’s response to the 
political problems he faced. Yet Dante could not simply derive his answer from 
Aristotle’s text; Aristotle had not faced the same political problems that existed in 
Dante’s age. Dante would have to provide his own solution. At the same time, Gilson 
does think that his reading of Aristotle encouraged Dante to endorse as ideal “a temporal 
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order independent of the Church and seeking its own final goal under the guidance of 
reason alone.”179 Thus, Dante was inspired by Aristotelian political philosophy, but his 
work is still uniquely his own. 
 Numerous other scholars have also questioned exactly how Aristotle helped 
shape Dante’s political and social thought. Allan Gilbert conducted a thorough 
investigation of which of Aristotle’s works Dante must have had direct access to 
(Nicomachean Ethics, Metaphysics, and De Anima among them) and which sources 
Dante could have used to mine the Politics quotations he used (if he did not have direct 
access to that text while he was writing). Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum is at 
the top of the list.180 Searching De monarchia for evidence of Aristotelian influence, 
Larry Peterman notes the overridingly practical nature of Dante’s political thought. He 
argues: 
The need that moved Dante to propose a universal world monarchy moved 
him away from the Aristotelian political tradition and led him to forgo the 
virtues at the forefront of that tradition… Given the condition of Dante’s 
time, as he understood it, and the influence of Christianity, the moral virtues 
of pagan antiquity are no longer possible. Even with divine inspiration, 
Dante’s monarch cannot reinstitute them in a world that demands above all 
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the unity and stability represented by world government. The best that man 
can hope for is that political order be reestablished.181 
However, given Aristotle’s deep concern with the practical side of political affairs, 
Dante’s decision might not be so un-Aristotelian after all.182 
 In his study of the impact of Aristotle on Dante’s writing, Lorenzo Minio-
Paluello came to the conclusion that many of Dante’s political ideas were influenced 
more by the non-political works of Aristotle than the Politics itself. Specifically, Dante 
developed his worldview through a reading of the Nicomachean Ethics, Physics, and De 
Caelo, which Minio-Paluello describes thus: “The universe is an integrated, order whole 
consisting of a large number of beings. One supreme being, God, regulates the functions 
and activities of other constituent beings.”183 These beings are not only ordered, they 
have a purpose: “Every thing of nature tends to its good, its own actualization.”184 For 
human beings, this actualization includes a political life. According to Minio-Paluello, 
Dante’s theory of monarchy is derived from this notion of ordered and teleological 
hierarchy; as there is one prime mover, there should be one temporal ruler to direct 
humanity in achieving its actualization. Thus, Dante is able to create an “Aristotelian” 
political theory that has very little in common with that found in Aristotle’s Politics.  
                                                 
181
 Larry Peterman, “Dante’s Monarchia and Aristotle’s Political Thought,” Studies in 
Medieval and Renaissance History 10 (1973): 3-40, p. 39. 
182
 See also Larry Peterman, “Dante and the Setting for Machiavellianism,” The 
American Political Science Review 76 (1982): 630-44, and “Machiavelli’s Dante and the 
Sources for Machiavellianism,” Polity 20 (1987): 247-72. 
183
 Minio-Paluello, “Dante’s Reading of Aristotle,” p. 65 
184
 Minio-Paluello, “Dante’s Reading of Aristotle,” p. 65 
 109 
 As the above analysis shows, despite vast investigation, many questions about 
Dante’s political thought are still up for debate. In many instances, this may be the result 
of the inherent tensions in Dante’s own thinking. Although a precursor to Renaissance 
and early modern thought in some ways, Dante is still largely rooted in a medieval 
Christian worldview. He was simultaneously an advocate of supranational world 
government and a protonationalist; his ability to balance these two impulse makes him 
especially appealing to modern advocates of cosmopolitanism. But most important for 
this dissertation is the conflict over how Aristotle helped shaped Dante’s political views 
and to what extent his world monarchy is a departure from an Aristotelian political 
philosophy. Again, prominent scholars come down on both sides of the question. 
Overall, Dante is seen as a thinker who, after the trauma of his own political expulsion, 
tried to craft a theory of politics that would bring about a lasting peace. 
 
CONVIVIO AND DE MONARCHIA 
Having examinationed what previous scholars have to say on Dante’s political 
ideas, this chapter now turns to Dante’s texts themselves. How does Dante craft his 
theory of politics, and to what extent is this theory shaped by Aristotelian ideas? 
Aristotle’s influence can be felt throughout Dante’s Convivio, a philosophical treatise 
believed to be modeled partially after Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy. From the 
opening lines, Dante attempts to link his intellectual project with that of the ancient 
philosopher: “As the Philosopher says at the beginning of the First Philosophy, all men 
by nature desire to know… Since knowledge is the ultimate perfection of our soul, in 
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which resides our ultimate happiness, we are all therefore by nature subject to a desire 
for it.”185 Regarding the knowledge that human beings seek, and in contrast to Ptolemy 
of Lucca, Dante enunciates what Nederman considers to be one of the prime tenets of 
medieval Aristotelianism, namely, the delineation between active and contemplative life 
and the corresponding virtues of each.186 Dante acknowledges the value of both forms of 
life, although he follows the Greek tradition in denoting the contemplative life as “best”: 
“We may have two kinds of happiness in this life, according to two different paths, good 
and best, which lead us there. One is the active life, and the other the contemplative 
life.”187  
Dante’s notion of virtue in the Convivio is also derived, in part at least, from 
Aristotle. After listing eleven moral virtues, for which Dante credits the Nicomachean 
Ethics as his source, he then goes on to describe the nature of these virtues to his reader: 
“Each of these virtues has two related enemies, that is, vices, one through excess and the 
other through deficit. These virtues constitute the mean between them, and they spring 
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from a single source, namely from our habit of good choice.”188 Dante provides his 
reader with a very concise description of Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean. In these 
ways, one can see that, in addition to utilizing Aristotelian concepts, several aspects of 
Dante’s moral thought were informed by important Aristotelian philosophical premises.  
 In De monarchia, Dante likewise turns to Aristotle for support. Although the 
governmental system espoused in this text is not one which Aristotle would have 
supported, or even recognized,189 Dante does draw on some common medieval 
Aristotelian premises in formulating his theory, such as the ordering of the universe and 
the political and teleological nature of mankind. These metaphysical tenets of Aristotle 
shape Dante’s political theory more than Aristotelian ethical or political texts do. Early 
in Book I of De monarchia, Dante states, “Now it has been sufficiently explained that 
the activity proper to mankind considered as a whole is constantly to actualize the full 
intellectual potential of humanity, primarily through thought and secondarily through 
action.”190 He then goes about arguing that the political system most likely to bring 
about this highest human potential is a world monarchy. Dante’s initial line of reasoning 
stems from the Aristotelian notion of ordered hierarchy, as Minio-Paluello explains it. 
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According to De monarchia, the need for a single ruler follows from the telos of 
mankind and the goodness of unity: 
A part stands in relation to the whole as to its end and perfection: therefore the 
order in a part stands to the order of the whole as to its end and perfection. From 
this it can be deduced that the goodness of the order in a part does not exceed the 
goodness of the order in the whole…the order of the parts in relation to that 
single entity is better, for it constitutes the end or purpose of their 
interrelationship… So if this second kind of order is discernable in the 
constituent parts which make up the human race, then with all the more reason 
must it be observable… in the human race considered as a whole or totality…. 
And thus all the parts we have enumerated which are lower than kingdoms, and 
those kingdoms themselves, must be ordered to one ruler or one rule, that is to a 
monarch or monarchy.191 
Here, Dante is employing techniques common in medieval Aristotelian argumentation, 
as well as engaging with some Aristotelian philosophical principles. The form and 
language of this passage would have been familiar to those accustomed to scholastic 
argument, despite its political extremism. 
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 Dante continues to employ Aristotelian language in the De monarchia, even as 
the gap between his views and those of Aristotle widens. This becomes quite evident in 
the passages where Dante contends that the ruler, under his system of government, will 
exhibit the greatest degree of justice. From the passages of the Convivio cited previously 
in this chapter and others, one can see that Dante was acquainted with the Aristotelian 
idea of the moral virtues. However, the discussion of princely justice in Book I of De 
monarchia illustrates an entirely different view of political justice. Dante’s monarch is 
free from the temptations of injustice because there is nothing he does not already justly 
possess:  
The thing most contrary to justice is greed, as Aristotle states in the fifth book of 
the Ethics. When greed is entirely eliminated, nothing remains which is opposed 
to justice… But where there is nothing which can be coveted, it is impossible for 
greed to exist, for emotions cannot exist where their objects have been destroyed. 
But there is nothing the monarch could covet, for his jurisdiction is bounded only 
by the ocean.192 
Though using the language of Aristotelian political virtue, Dante is not, in this instance, 
advocating a position that could be classified as Aristotelian; the justice sought by this 
proposed institutional arrangement is not a moral virtue. The moral education of the 
ruler, a crucial consideration to Aristotle and his medieval followers, is abandoned in 
                                                 
192
 “Quod iustie maxime contrariatur cupiditas, ut innuit Aristotiles in quinto ad 
Nicomacam. Remota cupiditate omnino, nichil iustitie restat adversum.... Ubi ergo non 
est quod possit optari, inpossibile est ibi cupiditatem esse:destructis enim obiectis, 
passiones esse non possunt. Sed Monarcha non habet possit optare: sua nanque 
iurisdictio terminatur Oceano solum.” De monarchia I.ix.11-13, pp.24-27. 
 114 
favor of institutional arrangements that limit temptation and therefore the need for true 
political virtue. 
 
ARISTOTLE’S ROLE IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF DANTE 
 To what extent was Dante’s political thought shaped by his reading of Aristotle? 
Reading the Convivio, one gets the clear impression that Dante had a strong sense of 
Aristotelian virtue ethics. He not only included a large number of detailed citations from 
the Ethics, but seems to base his system of moral philosophy on these Aristotelian 
principles. Dante notes the distinction between the active and contemplative life; he 
describes each virtue as being located between two extremes, each of which is a vice. 
Little in the Convivio directly conflict with Aristotelian moral premises. This is part of 
the reason why the departures from Aristotelian moral theory in De monarchia are so 
remarkable. Dante constructs a system of government in which peace and justice are 
maintained by giving all temporal authority to one individual. Yet, Dante makes no 
mention of the personal virtues the monarch must have or how the Doctrine of the Mean 
could come into play in his character. Nor is there any mention of the education of the 
monarch, an important theme in Aristotle and many of his medieval followers, including 
Giles of Rome, one of the suggested intermediate sources for Dante’s political 
Aristotelianism. The Aristotelian moral theory that dominates Convivio is almost entirely 
absent from De monarchia. 
 Instead of exhorting the monarch to virtue and self-restraint, Dante tries to ensure 
justice in his monarchy by making it logically impossible for the monarch to succumb to 
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greed. Everything and all authority belongs to him by right, so he is incapable of lusting 
after anything that isn’t his; no such thing exists. However, again breaking with 
Aristotle’s Politics, Dante’s institutional measure do not include any restraints on the 
monarch’s powers or “mixing” of regime type to keep one person or element of society 
from becoming unjust. In fact, Dante is quite explicit in saying that the monarch has no 
limits on his political power. In this way, Dante strays from one of Aristotle’s key 
political premises, that a true monarchy is unlikely to work in the real world. 
 Yet just because the main political arguments of Dante’s De monarchia run 
counter to those of the Politics does not mean that Aristotle did not have a hand in 
shaping Dante’s political views. Dante endorses the Aristotelian view that human beings 
are political by nature and require the guidance of a political community in order to 
fulfill their telos. Although Dante’s insistence that the primary aim of temporal 
government should be the maintenance of peace is reminiscent of Augustine of Hippo, 
he still posits a far more positive view of the role of government. In both De monarchia 
and the Divine Comedy Dante argues that the twin powers of the empire and the papacy 
are needed to lead mankind toward fulfillment and, ultimately, salvation. Although 
sharing the Christian notion that mankind’s ultimate telos is not located on this earth, 
Dante still sees politics as playing a critical role in the achievement of this telos, a thesis 
very much in keeping with Aristotle’s political philosophy. 
  Furthermore, as Lorenzo Minio-Paluello has argued, Dante was strongly 
influenced by Aristotle’s metaphysical views. Influenced in large part from his reading 
of Aristotle and his medieval commentators, Dante conceived of the universe as an 
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ordered whole, under divine direction. Just as the individuals has a purpose in this 
worldview, so does the universe as a whole. Throughout De monarchia, Dante uses 
syllogistic logic to argue that just as the universe is unified under the direction of a 
single God, so, too, the inhabitants of earth should be unified under the direction of a 
single political leader. Dante thus derives a political theory from Aristotelian 
metaphysical tenets that sharply disagrees with much of Aristotle’s own political theory. 
This could be (at least partially) the result, as Gilbert has suggested, of Dante not being 
as familiar with the text of the Politics as he was with many other works of Aristotle.193 
It could also be that Aristotle’s metaphysical works were more supportive of the imperial 
political ideology that Dante already advocated.  
 The above analysis all deals with the substance of Dante’s political theory. Yet 
despite endorsing an unorthodox (from an Aristotelian perspective) system of 
government, Dante still follows Aristotelian political methodology in his work. He uses 
Aristotelian political and moral language throughout both the Convivio and De 
monarchia. Additionally he uses the syllogistic logic of Aristotelian (and scholastic) 
philosophy in making his analogous claims about the need for a single temporal ruler. 
This language would have signaled to contemporary readers that he had been educated in 
the Aristotelian tradition and was part of the political science community. Finally, 
Dante’s De monarchia undertakes the Aristotelian project of determining the best type 
of regime. Dante spends nearly all of this relatively short political tract outlining why the 
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world will be best off under the leadership of a secular monarchy and how 
(institutionally) this monarchy will be able to help mankind secure its rightful end. 
 Dante’s De monarchia provides an excellent illustration of how a thinker could 
work within the Aristotelian paradigm yet come up with a solution utterly at odds with 
Aristotle’s constitutional theory. Dante argues for an absolutist unmixed worldwide 
monarchy. He also argues for ensuring justice, not through the moral education of the 
monarch, but by giving him absolute control of everything. This, however, does not 
disqualify him from being an Aristotelian, according to my definition. He still accepts 
the Aristotelian paradigm for the study of politics. Dante’s text addresses the same 
principle political questions Aristotle’s Politics. Compared to other Aristotelian political 
scientist, including Ptolemy of Lucca, who was examined in the previous chapter, Dante 
relies less heavily on empirical observations and more on logical and analogical 
arguments to support his conclusion.  
 Like Aristotle, Dante is well aware that politics is a practical science and must 
takes the particularities of time and place into account, as well as human beings’ natural 
flaws. Despite his ambitious claims for the monarch’s authority, Dante does seem aware 
that finding a perfectly virtuous individual to fill this role will be problematic, so he does 
not try. However, where Aristotle addresses this problem by mixing constitutional 
forms, forcing the monarch to share political power with other members of the 
community, Dante takes a very different approach. Dante makes it impossible for the 
ruler to overstep his bounds by making his power boundless. Although this proposed 
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solution can appear a bit ridiculous, it is yet another case of Dante seeing the same 
potential political problem as Aristotle but offering his own unique answer. 
 Aristotle’s effect on Dante’s political theory was great, even if Aristotle wouldn’t 
have endorsed many of Dante’s political suggestions. Dante can hardly be praised for his 
moderation. Yet, Dante’s Convivio shows extensive evidence that he espoused an 
Aristotelian moral theory. Additionally, Dante’s theory of human nature was 
fundamentally Aristotelian; he saw human being as having a telos that involved living a 
fulfilled political life while on earth, and the government had a positive role to play in 
helping mankind achieve that fulfillment. Dante also accepted an Aristotelian 
metaphysical view (albeit with an infusion of Christianity) that saw the universe as an 
ordered and purposeful whole. It was partially from this metaphysical perspective that 
Dante defended his idea of world monarchy. Finally, and most critically for my thesis, 
Dante adopted a medieval Aristotelian political methodology. For him, the purpose of 
political system was to determine the best regime type and then offer your supporting 
evidence; this he did in De monarchia. Thus, although departing from Aristotle’s 
political premises in important ways, Dante is still a medieval Aristotelian.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
 The Aristotelian paradigm dominated the study of politics for much of the late 
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. It set the standards for who was part of the 
political science community and how they should conduct their studies. This Aristotelian 
paradigm was transmitted through the medieval education system, the heart of which 
was the University of Paris. Medieval Aristotelians read a mixture of the major works of 
Aristotle and medieval works that grew out of them. They drew from both Aristotelian 
philosophy and the tenets of medieval Christianity to create a unique worldview. The 
moral and political language of Aristotle permeated their work, making it understandable 
to other members of the scientific community and signaling their own membership 
within that community. Most critically, the medieval Aristotelians agreed on the 
appropriate subject for political investigation. They followed the methodology of the 
Politics, examining the different forms of regimes and determining which was best. 
Thus, contrary to the beliefs of some modern political scientists, the medieval 
Aristotelians were a mature science. Political science is not a new science by any means, 
but a very old one that has been through multiple paradigm shifts. 
 
WAS THE ARISTOTELIAN PARADIGM A SUCCESS? 
 Having argued that the medieval political Aristotelians meet all of Kuhn’s major 
criteria for a mature scientific community, I must now ask what the effects of this 
paradigm were on the study of politics. As I mentioned in earlier chapters, the adoption 
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of the Aristotelian paradigm was accompanied by a dramatic increase in political studies 
in the late Middle Ages. More thinkers were interested in both constitutional questions 
and politics in general. In this sense, the Aristotelian paradigm was a success. As Kuhn’s 
theory predicts, the adoption of a single paradigm by the field led to a blossoming of 
political research. People from a variety of different backgrounds weighed in on the 
central political debate. Additionally, the Aristotelian paradigm brought focus to the 
study of politics. Earlier political thought was often found mixed in with other topics in 
advice books for princes, compendia, or works of theology or history. After the 
introduction of Aristotle, a far greater number of purely political tracts began to appear; 
these works directly addressed political questions and especially the question of regime 
type. These works also tended to be better organized and provide justification for their 
political views. In several ways this later medieval political thought was more 
“scientific.” 
 Yet there is still a problem with applying Kuhn’s theory to medieval 
Aristotelianism. Kuhn states that, within a paradigm, over time scholars will be able to 
build upon one another’s work, fitting together the pieces of a puzzle. There is little 
evidence of this among the medieval Aristotelians. Thinkers were far more likely to 
offer a competing answer to Aristotle’s key political question than to build on the work 
of their predecessors. As a result, you never see the accumulation of knowledge one 
would hope for in a mature science. 
 There are several possible explanations for this. This first is that consensus may 
not be possible in a field that requires the answering of normative questions. Aristotelian 
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political sciences required the researcher to collect information on the different types of 
constitutions and draw causal inferences about how those political institutions affected 
the lives of people living within the city. Yet it also required the thinker to then use this 
information to determine which of these systems provided people with the best life and 
the best opportunity for flourishing. This latter question may just be essentially 
contestable. If political thinkers were unable to reach an agreement on what type of 
constitution was best, it may have prevented them from moving forward. 
 Another possibility is that the range of political research under the Aristotelian 
paradigm was just too narrow. There was essentially one central question that 
Aristotelian political science had to address: What is the best type of regime? Once that 
had been answered, people didn’t really know what puzzle to move on to next. So, 
instead of building on previous work, they offered their own alternative answer instead. 
Because there was no logical next step, the result was conflicting information instead of 
cumulative information. The overly narrow Aristotelian paradigm, may have, in the long 
run stifled political research by limiting its scope. The paradigm became too much of a 
straightjacket. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 My dissertation looks at the establishment of the Aristotelian paradigm in 
political science in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. In future research 
I’d like to examine how this paradigm came to lose its dominant position. Through the 
early part of the fourteenth century, Aristotle’s model for political science was standard 
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practice in the field, yet by the early Renaissance it was no longer in use. What caused 
this? How and why did the Aristotelian paradigm lose its place? I wish to discover what, 
if any, paradigm took its place as the dominant model for political inquiry. Was the 
Aristotelian paradigm replaced by another paradigm that could better address the 
political issues of the late Middle Ages and Renaissance? Or, did it simply collapse 
under its own rigidity, leaving a splintered community of scholars in its place?  
 My future research will also evaluate whether the adoption of a universal 
paradigm benefited the study of politics in the long run. Although the parameters set for 
research by the Aristotelian paradigm may have been stifling, was this outweighed by its 
ability to draw interest to the study of politics and bring disparate thinkers together in a 
scientific community? Once established, did the political science community continue to 
prosper as an intellectual institution, even after the dominance of the Aristotelian 
paradigm had faded? These latter questions hold special importance for those within the 
discipline of political science today who advocate (or oppose) the adoption of a single 
paradigm by all its practitioners. What are the costs and benefits of such an action? 
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